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Jurisdiction, Merits, and Non-Extant Rights 
Howard M. Wasserman* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Congressional threats against the jurisdiction of federal courts date to 
the early days of the Union.1  The threat even has its own pithy 
nicknamejurisdiction strippingto describe congressional efforts to 
reduce or eliminate the power of the United States Supreme Court and 
the lower federal courts to hear and resolve particular classes of 
controversial federal constitutional claims.2  The scope of congressional 
power to jurisdiction-strip remains the great, heretofore unresolved, 
debate among procedure and constitutional law scholars, as well as the 
courts.3 
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 1. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1499, 14991500 (1990) (From the First Judiciary Act on, this question has periodically 
occupied center stage in the high drama of national politics.); Gerald Gunther, Congressional 
Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 
STAN. L. REV. 895, 896 (1984) (Jurisdiction-curbing proposals have surfaced in Congress in 
virtually every period of controversial federal court decisions.). 
 2. See John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: 
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 98687 (2002) ([M]ost discussions of 
congressional regulation dwell on laws that deprive federal judges of power to hear a particular case 
or class of cases because of its controversial nature, or what has come to be known as jurisdiction 
stripping.); see also Amar, supra note 1, at 14991500 (identifying controversial issues at play in 
the jurisdiction-stripping controversy, such as abortion and flag burning); Gunther, supra note 1, at 
895 (stating that most of the jurisdiction-stripping proposals of the early 1980s stem from 
dissatisfaction with Supreme Court decisions, especially those dealing with . . . controversial social 
issues such as school prayer, abortion, and busing as a remedy in school desegregation); Judith 
Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. 
L. REV. 924, 980 (2000) (Protesting federal jurisdiction can also be a way to object to an underlying 
legal norm . . . .). 
 3. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF 
POWER 25 (2d ed. 1990) (describing significant case law indicating that Congress has significant 
power to prohibit the Supreme Court from taking jurisdiction over cases allocated to its appellate 
jurisdiction); id. at 29 (describing argument that, because Congress need not have created lower 
federal courts, it could create such courts, but limit their jurisdiction); Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-
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Never killed and buried,4 the controversy has returned in force in 
recent years amid congressional rumblings about bringing an out-of-
control judiciary to heel.5  In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,6 the Court 
interpreted its way out of a potential jurisdiction strip expressly to avoid 
grave questions about Congress authority to impinge upon th[e] 
                                                                                                                       
Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 
205, 22930 (1985) (arguing that the federal judiciary, consisting of the Supreme Court and any 
lower federal courts, must have an original or appellate opportunity to hear any cases involving 
federal questions); Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Federal Court 
Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498, 504 (1974) (arguing that because of changing circumstances, the 
framers aspirations for the national judiciary cannot be fulfilled today without lower federal 
courts); Gunther, supra note 1, at 921 (arguing against jurisdiction-stripping enactments because 
they are unwise and violate the spirit of the Constitution, even though they are . . . within the sheer 
legal authority of Congress); Henry Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of 
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953) (arguing that any 
exceptions to jurisdiction must not be such as will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court 
in the constitutional plan); Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on 
Congress Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 65 
(1981) (arguing that limits on congressional power are crossed when Congress attempts to divest 
the Supreme Court, and all other federal courts, of jurisdiction at least to review state court decisions 
on constitutional challenges to governmental behavior); id. at 7677 (When Congress manipulates 
jurisdiction in an effort to deny recognition and judicial enforcement of constitutional rights, it has 
deliberately set itself against the Constitution as the Court understands that document.).  For recent 
innovative additions to the debate, see Laurence Claus, Constitutional Guarantees of the Judiciary: 
Jurisdiction, Tenure, and Beyond, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 459, 460 (Supp. 2006) ([T]he text seems to 
guarantee that one supreme Court will hold a power of ultimate judgment over every dispute that 
parties choose to litigate, so long as that dispute is one to which Article III extends the judicial 
Power of the United States.); Laurence Claus, The One Court That Congress Cannot Take Away: 
Singularity, Supremacy, and Article III, 96 GEO. L.J. 59, 64 (2007) (Congress cannot use its 
Exceptions power to achieve particular desired answers to questions that fall within the judicial 
Power of the United States.); infra notes 23242 and accompanying text. 
 4. See Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and the Role of 
Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the Courts, 78 IND. L.J. 153, 165 (2003) (To 
the extent that Congress has, as a matter of constitutional custom, declined to impeach unpopular 
judges, to court-pack, or jurisdiction-strip because it has long regarded such practices as antithetical 
to Article III independence, the stature and stability of Congresss self-restraint is logically 
enhanced.); Sager, supra note 3, at 20 (In large measure, our failure to lay these questions to rest is 
the product of the mutual respect and self-restraint that have characterized the behavior of Congress 
and of the Supreme Court in their dealings with one another.). 
 5. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 24951 (2004) (discussing use of blunt political tools to establish control and 
accountability in federal courts); Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 2, at 984 (When we turn to 
Congress, moreover, we find a wide array of tools available to rein in a rambunctious judiciary.); 
Helen Norton, Reshaping Federal Jurisdiction: Congresss Latest Challenge to Judicial Review, 41 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1003, 1018 (2006) (arguing that jurisdiction-stripping efforts are animated by 
the perception of federal courts disregard for the peoples understanding of fundamental 
constitutional and/or moral principles); Caprice L. Roberts, Jurisdiction Stripping in Three Acts: A 
Three String Serenade, 51 VILL. L. REV. 593, 631 (2006) (describing arguments that [f]ederal 
courts have run amok and tilted the balance of power among the three branches too far and that 
Congress had to act in order to stop the despotism of the federal judicial bench); Sager, supra note 
3, at 38 (Perhaps Congress power to regulate jurisdiction ought to be understood as its final trump, 
as an appropriate way for the national legislature to curb a judiciary run amok.). 
 6. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
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Courts appellate jurisdiction.7  The Military Commissions Act of 2006 
explicitly stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas corpus 
petitions and all other claims against the United States or its officers and 
agents brought by individuals detained by the United States and 
determined by the United States to be enemy combatants.8 
More common efforts at jurisdiction stripping seek to remove 
particular, controversial federal constitutional issues from the scope of 
the federal courts otherwise broad general federal question jurisdiction.  
Consider some recent examples.  In the 109th Congress, there was the 
Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, which would have deprived federal 
courts of original and appellate jurisdiction to hear any claim against a 
government entity or officer for the acknowledgement of God as the 
sovereign source of law, liberty, or government.9  In the 110th 
Congress, there is the We the People Act, which would deprive federal 
courts of power to adjudicate laws, regulations, or policies of any State 
or unit of local government relating to the free exercise or establishment 
of religion.10  Such bills historically have gone nowhere,11 although 
some recent proposals passed in the Republican-controlled House of 
Representatives, perhaps indicating a sea change in interbranch relations 
at least in one house of Congress.12 
                                                     
 7. Id. at 276364, 2769 (holding that jurisdiction-stripping provision did not apply 
retroactively). 
 8. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 263536 
(2006). The Supreme Court likely will pass on the validity of this jurisdiction-stripping provision 
during the October Term 2007.  See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert 
granted, Al Odah v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 3067 (2007). 
 9. S. 520, 109th Cong. §§ 10102 (2005).  Another example was the Marriage Protection Act 
of 2007, which would deprive federal courts of original and appellate jurisdiction to hear or decide 
any question pertaining to the interpretation of, or the validity under the Constitution of, the 
Defense of Marriage Act.  Marriage Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 724, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (2007).  
The Defense of Marriage Act, enacted in 1996, provides that states need not give full faith and credit 
to same-sex marriages valid in other states.  28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000). 
 10. We the People Act, H.R. 300, 110th Cong. § 3(1)(A) (2007).  The bill also would have 
stripped federal jurisdiction to adjudicate privacy and equal protection claims related to sexual 
orientation, sexual practices, and the right to marry.  Id. §§ 3(1)(B)(C). 
 11. See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 2, at 988 (The chronic failure of these efforts to divest 
federal courts of jurisdiction easily could mislead one into believing that Congress cannot, as a 
practical matter, effectively control federal judges by regulating their jurisdiction.); Michael J. 
Gerhardt, Whats Old Is New Again, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1267, 1280 (2006) ([T]he failure of these 
measures may reflect the ongoing acceptance within the House of a constitutional norm against 
legislation that would directly interfere with judicial decisions or decision making.); Sager, supra 
note 3, at 20 (arguing that, although jurisdiction-stripping measures have been proposed, Congress 
has almost always repudiated such efforts). 
 12. James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of 
Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 19394 (2007) (calling the adoption of 
some stripping provisions in the House something of a watershed in the history of Congresss 
relationship with the federal courts); Norton, supra note 5, at 100304.  For example, the Pledge 
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A distinct, but too often conflated, way to restrict the reach and 
impact of federal judicial power is to reduce, limit, or eliminate the 
substantive constitutional, statutory and common law rights that are 
enforced in federal courts.13  The result is that enforceable substantive 
rights cease to exist or never come into existence under applicable legal 
rules.14  Non-existence is obvious if, for example, we imagine A seeking 
relief against B on rights purportedly established in a piece of federal 
legislation that never was enacted into law in accordance with 
constitutional requirements of bicameral passage and presidential 
approval.15  The same is true if the right-creating legislation, although 
enacted, is constitutionally invalid.16  I suggest going further.  We can 
define a right as non-extant any time the legal rule A seeks to enforce 
against B is not broad enough to be implicated by the actors, conduct, 
and events at issue.  Any claim of right on such a non-extant legal rule 
must fail on the merits, because under applicable, controlling legal rules, 
A cannot sue B (at least not successfully) for Bs conduct.17 
Stripping jurisdiction and narrowing or eliminating (stripping, if you 
will) substantive rights arguably produces identical resultsimposing 
door-closing and access-limiting rules18 or rules that limit decision 
making opportunities for federal courts.19  Commentators20 and courts21 
                                                                                                                       
Protection Act of 2005 (introduced in both the House and Senate) would have deprived the Supreme 
Court and lower federal courts of authority to hear or decide any question pertaining to the 
interpretation of, or the validity under the Constitution of, the Pledge of Allegiance . . . or its 
recitation.  Pledge Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 2389, 109th Cong. (2005); Pledge Protection Act of 
2005, S. 1046, 109th Cong. (2005).  The House passed its version in July 2006, but the Senate 
version went nowhere. 
 13. See Louise Weinberg, The Article III Box: The Power of Congress to Attack the 
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1405, 1407 (2000) (describing the question of 
jurisdiction stripping as somewhat unreal because jurisdiction is not necessarily the rigorously 
narrow technical concept that experts on the subject would have it); see also Ferejohn & Kramer, 
supra note 2, at 1034 ([I]t is far more typical for the Court to exercise jurisdiction while applying 
substantive legal tests that leave political actors free to choose their course of action without any 
realistic threat of judicial intercession.). 
 14. See Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions and 
Judicial Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105, 111213 (2003) (introducing the idea of a legal rule not 
existing as law). 
 15. See id. at 111719; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 16. Adler & Dorf, supra note 14, at 111920; see also, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 
55556 (2001) (rejecting claim for damages under federal statute that could not constitutionally be 
applied to conduct at issue). 
 17. See John Harrison, Jurisdiction, Congressional Power, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 
GEO. L.J. 2513, 2515 (1998) (describing congressional power to determine who is entitled to sue 
whom, for what, and for what remedy). 
 18. Weinberg, supra note 13, at 1408. 
 19. Judith Resnik, The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Sources, Alternative Texts, 
and Altered Aspirations, 86 GEO. L.J. 2589, 2615 (1998). 
 20. See generally Resnik, supra note 19, at 2615 (describing statute authorizing prosecution of 
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often speak of jurisdiction in describing situations in which the rights 
to be vindicated do not exist as law.  Perhaps Louise Weinberg is correct 
to argue that laws and judicial decisions repealing or limiting substantive 
rights and causes of action may loosely but realistically be called limits 
on jurisdiction.22 
I have argued previously that something different occurs when legal 
rule makers grant judicial subject matter jurisdiction, as opposed to 
creating or determining the meaning of enforceable substantive rights 
and the merits of claims on such rights.23  It follows that something 
different occurs when the result of legal rule making is the establishment 
of a legal rule that strips judicial subject matter jurisdiction, as opposed 
to a rule that renders enforceable substantive rights and duties non-
extant.  Even if the results of the distinct rules look similar, they must be 
kept distinct.  Stripping jurisdiction does not, in fact, produce the same 
results as rendering rights non-extant.  The results look similar only if we 
limit our focus to the size of federal dockets and the number of cases 
filed in federal courts.  A party seeking federal judicial vindication of 
rights will lose her case, whether for a failure of jurisdiction or a failure 
of the claim on the merits. 
Significant distinctions emerge when we focus on other concerns.  
The first concern is what remains after narrowing the legal rule.  
Jurisdiction strips leave enforceable substantive rights in place, but shift 
enforcement of those rights from federal to state courts.  Non-extant 
rights obviously cannot be enforced in any court.24  A second concern 
involves differences among three fundamental conceptsjudicial subject 
matter jurisdiction, legislative (or prescriptive) jurisdiction, and 
litigation.  Each concept is affected differently by a legal rule that targets 
jurisdiction as opposed to substantive rights.25  The third concern goes to 
the litigation process, and how legal and factual issues underlying legal 
rules will be heard and resolved.26  Finally, there are differences as to the 
                                                                                                                       
particular crime as a jurisdiction-conferring statute and the Supreme Court decision striking it 
down as arguing against federal jurisdiction for the statute); Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 
81 IND. L.J. 1001, 1014, 1035 (2006) (arguing that recognizing certain actionable federal 
constitutional claims would dramatically expand the jurisdiction of federal courts). 
 21. See United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 951 (7th Cir. 2003) (en 
banc) ([L]egislative history shows that jurisdiction stripping is what Congress had in mind in 
enacting FTAIA.). 
 22. See Weinberg, supra note 13, at 140708; see also Resnik, supra note 2, at 1004 
(discussing link between size of federal docket and extent to which Congress regulates under its 
powers). 
 23. Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643, 645 (2005). 
 24. See Hart, supra note 3, at 136364; infra Part IV.A. 
 25. See infra Parts IV.B. 
 26. See infra Part IV.C. 
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structural and constitutional legitimacy of a legal rule that produces a 
limit on jurisdiction, as opposed to one that limits or eliminates 
substantive rights.  Whatever the long-standing controversy over 
Congresss power to jurisdiction-strip,27 that controversy does not and 
should not extend to legal rules producing non-extant rights.28 
This Article explains these fundamental differences and argues that 
courts, commentators, and legal rule makers must recognize and respect 
those differences.  The Article proceeds in three steps.  First, the Article 
explains how rights might come to be non-extantto not exist as law.  
This concept is founded on Wesley Hohfelds famous model of legal 
relations, with a particular focus on legal rules establishing rights, 
imposing duties, and establishing or maintaining liberties.29  Second, the 
Article discusses eight illustrations of non-extant rights, showing how 
rights are created and eliminated, and the effect on civil actions brought 
to enforce those rights.30  Third, the Article examines and explains the 
fundamental distinctions between legal rules that strip judicial subject 
matter jurisdiction, and legal rules that produce non-extant rights.31 
II. RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND LIBERTIES 
To understand the idea of non-extant rights as I use it, we must break 
down two concepts: (1) legal rights and (2) non-existence as law, or what 
Matthew Adler and Michael Dorf call nonlaw.32 
A. Hohfelds Model of Rights, Duties, and Liberties 
In speaking of rights, I adopt Wesley Hohfelds famous model of 
legal relations.  Positive legal rules or norms (whether constitutional, 
statutory, or common law) are established by an authorized legal rule 
maker (whether legislative, executive, administrative, or judicial).33  
                                                     
 27. See supra note 3. 
 28. See infra Part IV.D. 
 29. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1914).  See also Arthur L. Corbin, Jural Relations and Their 
Classification, 30 YALE L.J. 226 (1921); Steven D. Walt, Corbin on Federal Courts: Legal 
Positivism and Mid-Century Opposition to Erie (Univ. of Va. Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 14, 2004), available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent. 
cgi?article=1020&context=uvalwps; infra Part II. 
 30. See infra Part III. 
 31. See infra Part IV. 
 32. Adler & Dorf, supra note 14, at 1129. 
 33. Walt, supra note 29. 
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Hohfeld argues that these rules establish a web of eight distinct legal 
positions, three of which form the focus of the present analysis: (1) rights 
in the strict sense (also called claim-rights34); (2) duties; and (3) 
privileges (or liberties).35 
Claim-rights and duties correlate.  A legal rule (established by 
constitutional, statutory, or common law provision, as written or 
interpreted) grants to A the right to be treated some way by B or to be 
free from certain treatment by B.  If no such positive legal enactment 
exists, A has no right.  The rule of law that grants As right necessarily 
imposes on B a duty to act or to refrain from acting in a certain way 
toward A.  If such a rule does not exist, B is under no duty to act or 
refrain from acting.36 
A claim-right exists if a purported right-holder can invoke legal 
mechanisms to protect her interests; that is, if what Corbin called the 
giant, some sovereign wielding its judicial and executive enforcement 
processes, will protect the right-holder and punish the duty-holder to help 
vindicate the right when the latter acts against his obligations.  As Corbin 
explains the framework, a right exists for A when legal rules require 
government to aid A by controlling or sanctioning B and Bs conduct; if 
legal rules do not require government to aid A as against B, A has no-
right.37  That is, no right exists as law.  It follows that B is under no duty 
because no duty exists as law. 
Rights under the Hohfeldian model contrast with privileges or 
liberties, which focus on an actors own conduct.38  B has a privilege or 
liberty when he is entitled to act or not act as he pleases, without 
interference from the giant.39  John Finnis suggests that the distinction 
between rights and liberties turns on whose conduct is being controlled.  
The true claim-right in A looks to the conduct of B toward A, while a 
                                                     
 34. See Linda C. McClain, Rights and Irresponsibility, 43 DUKE L.J. 989, 1040 (1994) (arguing 
that this is the only technically proper use of the word right). 
 35. See Hohfeld, supra note 29, at 30; Corbin, supra note 29, at 229; see also Mitchell N. 
Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. 
L.J. 1, 3233 (2001) (describing Hohfelds model); Walt, supra note 29 (arguing that Hohfeld did 
not characterize the components of legal rights, but sought to describe the relations between legal 
positions). 
 36. See Hohfeld, supra note 29, at 32; see also JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL 
RIGHTS 20001 (1980) (describing Hohfelds model); Corbin, supra note 29, at 229 (same); Walt, 
supra note 29 (same). 
 37. See Corbin, supra note 29, at 229. 
 38. See Hohfeld, supra note 29, at 33 (emphasizing the importance of keeping the conception 
of a right (or claim) and the conception of a privilege quite distinct from each other). 
 39. See Corbin, supra note 29, at 229 (stating that if the giant will not aid B, and A is free 
from constraint, A has a privilege); Hohfeld, supra note 29, at 32 (stating that X has a privilege of 
entering onto land is equivalent to X has no duty to stay off the land). 
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liberty in A looks to As own acts, omissions, and forbearances toward 
the world.40  Thus, A has a claim-right to receive something from B 
(positively) or to not be interfered with or dealt with in a certain manner 
by B (negatively).41  On the other hand, A has a liberty to act or not act in 
some manner as she chooses. 
If B has a privilege to act some way, B correlatively bears no duty to 
refrain from acting; the existence of a duty negates the existence of a 
liberty and vice versa.42  That liberty continues until a different positive 
legal rule imposes duties on B, and correspondingly, grants rights in A.  
Privileges/liberties also cover that part of Bs conduct that is not 
regulated by a different legal norm.  In other words, an extant legal norm 
may create some right in A and impose some correlative duties on others.  
But if the right does not extend to B or to Bs particular conduct in some 
instance, then B has no duty under that legal rule, meaning B continues 
to have a liberty to act as he pleases.43 
Importantly, distinct legal relations can be conjoined, as when As 
liberty to act is enhanced by a claim-right against B that B not interfere 
with As exercise of her liberty.44  Thus, as Mitchell Berman suggests, 
the First Amendment freedom of speech can be understood as As liberty 
to speak conjoined with a claim-right that government (B) not interfere 
with As exercise of that liberty.45  And As claim-right correlates to the 
governments duty not to interfere with her exercise of her liberty. 
B. Law and Nonlaw 
The second concept, non-existence as law, derives from Adler and 
Dorfs concept of constitutional existence conditions.46  A provision of 
federal sub-constitutional law (such as a right-creating statute) does not 
exist as law if some constitutional requirements or pre-conditions are not 
satisfied.47  Existence conditions mark the line between law and 
nonlaw, and a purported enactment that does not satisfy those 
                                                     
 40. FINNIS, supra note 36, at 20001. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Hohfeld, supra note 29, at 32 (The privilege of entering is the negation of a duty to 
stay off.); Walt, supra note 29 ([I]f B has a duty to A to do x, B does not have the privilege 
(liberty) of doing x. Bs privilege to do x is the negative (opposite) of Bs duty to do x.). 
 43. See Corbin, supra note 29, at 229; Hohfeld, supra note 29, at 3233. 
 44. Corbin, supra note 29, at 201. 
 45. Berman, supra note 35, at 34 & n.135. 
 46. Adler & Dorf, supra note 14, at 110708 (describing process of identifying what constitutes 
authoritative utterances from Congressthat is, laws). 
 47. Id. at 1108, 111920, 1155. 
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requirements or conditions is nonlaw.48  We can extrapolate that if no 
provision recognizable as law grants a claim-right (and imposes a 
corresponding duty), the right-duty legal relation also does not exist as 
law.49 
Adler and Dorf provide an obvious example.  A, who suffered 
injuries on the job, sues B, his employer, to enforce rights under the Safe 
Workplaces Act, a federal statute purporting to create a right to work in a 
safe environment and providing workers with claims for damages against 
their employers for work-related injuries.50  Unfortunately for the 
plaintiff, the bill never was enacted into law pursuant to the 
constitutional requirements of bicameral passage and signature by the 
President.51  It seems obvious that A cannot have a claim-right under a 
statute that never came into legal being.  It seems correlatively obvious 
that B is not under any duty to act or not toward A in any way imposed 
by a non-extant provision.  It follows that the claim-right in A and duties 
in B that would have been established by that provision do not exist as 
lawthey are nonlaw. 
Whether a right exists as law is a contextual inquiry, not 
determinable at a too-high level of generality.  Existence of a right as law 
depends on the scope and breadth of the legal rule and whether the right 
is implicated, or potentially implicated, in particular conduct involving 
particular actors.  A right exists in A as against B only when A falls 
within the class of the legal norms right-holders, B falls within the class 
of duty-bearers, and the conduct is of the kind required or regulated by 
the norm.52  If As right and Bs duty are not so broad as to be implicated 
in the conduct, transaction, or occurrence at issue, the broader right does 
not exist as lawit is nonlaw.53 
                                                     
 48. Id. at 1129. 
 49. See Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial 
Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1462 (1997) (If agents of the state have not 
adopted rules of decision that provide determinate answers to the questions in the case at bar, then 
arguably there is simply no law to applystate or federaland federal courts should rule against the 
party who bears the burden of persuasion on the question at issue.). 
 50. See Adler & Dorf, supra note 14, at 111719.  Of course, it is unlikely that anyone would 
sue under a law that never had been enacted.  But this scenario is necessary to illustrate the full 
scope of the effect of non-extant legal rights. 
 51. Id. at 1118; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 52. See Harrison, supra note 17, at 252021 (arguing that the plaintiffs claim depends on 
allegations and proof that the defendants conduct was . . . inconsistent with a duty resting on the 
defendant . . . and that the plaintiff is within the category of persons entitled to judicial relief because 
of the wrongful conduct). 
 53. See Clark, supra note 49, at 1467 ([T]he law simply does not apply, by its terms, to a wide 
variety of human conduct.). 
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Existence as law also may be sovereign-specific and rule-maker-
specific. The legal relation of right-duty correlative may exist under the 
laws of one sovereign but not under the laws of another.  Constitutional 
federalism means that some liberties, rights, and duties cannot exist as 
the law of the federal sovereign through congressional enactment, even if 
they may exist as the law of a sovereign state.54  The problem is not the 
norm that establishes the right and imposes the duty, but rather the 
source of the norm.55  Similarly, a federal right might exist as federal 
constitutional law or federal statutory law. 
The substantive merits of a legal claim of right focus on who can sue 
whom over what real-world conduct and for what remedy under 
applicable law.56  In Hohfeldian terms, the focus is who has rights 
against whom as to what conduct.  Success on a claim depends on the 
plaintiffs showing that the defendant violated some legal right, which 
means showing that the defendant acted in a way inconsistent with a 
duty resting on [him] in the circumstances at issue.57  This is the essence 
of Charles Clarks definition of a cause of action as a series of acts or 
events, which gives rise to one or more legal relations of right-duty 
enforceable in the courts.58 
A prevails when she invokes the judicial process (i.e., when she calls 
on the giant) only if she can sue B for the conduct at issuethat is, if a 
right exists as law in A, enforceable against B for this conduct.  If no 
existing legal rule establishes rights and imposes duties on these actors 
for the acts and events at issue, A loses on her claim.  No legal norm 
exists to be violated by these actors or in these events because the law 
stopped short of establishing rights and duties. 
                                                     
 54. See Resnik, supra note 2, at 1004 (describing arguments that certain problems . . . belong 
to the states); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000) (expressing concern for 
Congress asserting authority to regulate areas of traditional state regulation). 
 55. Resnik, supra note 2, at 980 ([J]urisdictional arguments can, in a federalist government, 
also be premised on an objection to the fact of federalrather than stateenforcement of that 
norm.). 
 56. Harrison, supra note 17, at 2515; see James Leonard, Ubi Remedium Ibi Jus, Or, Where 
Theres a Remedy, Theres a Right: A Skeptics Critique of Ex Parte Young, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
215, 280 (2004) (arguing that Congress may therefore choose who is entitled to enforce a claim in 
court, and equally important, who may not). 
 57. See Harrison, supra note 17, at 2520. 
 58. Charles E. Clark, The Code Cause of Action, 33 YALE L.J. 817, 828 (1924); see also 
Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777, 796 (2004) (arguing 
that Clark viewed a plaintiff as having a cause of action if she was entitled to some remedy on the 
facts at issue). 
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III. NON-EXTANT RIGHTS: ILLUSTRATIONS 
Under the positivist view, rights are created by a legal rule or norm 
and a legal rule or norm exists because it is created by the regular acts 
of those legislative or judicial officials authorized to do so.59  Right-
creating legal rules can derive from a number of legal rule makers and a 
number of legal sources.  Rights can be established by the legislative, 
executive, or judicial branches, acting individually or in concert.  They 
can derive from the Constitution, statutes, or common law.  They may be 
a product of federal law, of state law, or of an interaction between the 
two. 
As to federal statutory rights, the initial rule maker is Congress, 
which enacts right-creating legislation pursuant to its substantive 
legislative power to create, decline to create, or limit rights, and to 
determine who is entitled to sue whom, for what, and for what 
remedy.60  Determinations of the scope and reach of rights created and 
duties imposed does not end with passage in Congress, since Congress 
does not and cannot anticipate every real-world factual situation to which 
a statute will be applied in the future.61  A statute also must be 
interpreted, implemented, and applied to real-world situations by the 
other branches of government, requiring a seamless process of making 
policy.62  And there similarly is a seamless process of establishing, or 
not, rights and duties. 
Sometimes this role for the other branches is deliberate and 
explicit.63  Many statutes are drafted with the expectation that courts will 
fill gaps as to the rights created through judicial common law reasoning 
                                                     
 59. Walt, supra note 29 (Its content is fixed by the regular behavior of these officials in 
creating norms.). 
 60. Harrison, supra note 17, at 2515.  See Leonard, supra note 56, at 280 (describing 
Congresss substantive authority to legislate within its constitutional ambit, including the power to 
create or not create causes of action and to choose who may or may not enforce claims in court). 
 61. See Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1389, 
1404 (2005). 
 62. See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Paradox of Expansionist Statutory 
Interpretations, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1219 (2007) (Statutory interpretation represents a critical 
element in the process by which legislative policy takes shape.); Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights 
of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Approach, 76 WASH. L. REV. 67, 120 (2001) (describing the 
drafting, enactment, interpretation, and implementation of legislation as a single, ongoing 
process). 
 63. See LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 32 (2004) (defining foundational statutes reflecting a legislative 
strategy of generality and incompleteness and reliance on the independent normative judgment of 
the judiciary); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. 
L. REV. 2085, 212829 (2002) (defining dynamic interpretive statutes as those that hinge on the 
future actions of others to be given content). 
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and decision making.64  Others expressly await action by the President, 
executive branch officers, or administrative agencies through regulatory 
rulemaking and enforcement decisions.65  Judicial and executive 
interpretations of a statute become as much a part of the legal ruleand 
thus the potential source of a right or non-rightas the statutory text.66 
As to constitutional rules, the common modern understanding is that 
judicial interpretation and application determines the scope of the 
liberties and rights created.67  And while recent scholarship has sought to 
de-link the Constitution and the courts,68 as a historical matter, no non-
                                                     
 64. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 596 (1994) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (The common-law method instated by the fair use provision of the copyright 
statute presumes that rules will emerge from the course of decisions. (citation omitted)); Natl 
Socy of Profl Engrs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (stating that the legislative history 
of the Sherman Act makes it perfectly clear that [Congress] expected the courts to give shape to the 
statutes broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition); see also SAGER, supra note 63, at 
31 (arguing that the federal courts have had to create substantial bodies of law whose origins are the 
compact and somewhat gnomic congressional utterances). 
 65. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255 (2006) (Executive actors often must interpret 
the enactments Congress has charged them with enforcing and implementing.); Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84344 (1984) (If Congress has explicitly left 
a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a 
specific provision of the statute by regulation.); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The 
Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1286 (1996) (If Congress 
passes a statute creating a regulatory scheme and delegating to the President authority to implement 
it, then the President must interpret the statutory framework in deciding how best to carry the law 
into effect.). 
 66. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 284 (2001) (stating that one cannot separate 
enforcement of a statute from enforcement of administrative regulations that authoritatively construe 
the statute itself); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 112 (1989) (A 
rule of law that is the product of judicial interpretation of a vague, ambiguous, or incomplete 
statutory provision is no less binding than a rule that is based on the plain meaning of a statute.). 
 67. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997); SAGER, supra note 63, at 70 
(Particularly in its liberty-bearing provisions, the Constitution offers broad structural propositions 
and moral generalities, and the judiciary has by and large accepted the obligation to fill in these 
general stipulations with concrete applications, to fashion workable and defensible conceptions of 
the Constitutions moral concepts.); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial 
Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1377 n.79 (1997) (Supreme Court decisions 
provide more clarity than the constitutional text alone.). 
 68. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 5, at 253 (arguing for an understanding of judicial review in 
which the Supreme Court understands itself as responsible for interpreting the Constitution 
according to their best judgment, but with an awareness that there is a higher authority out there with 
power to overturn their decisions); SAGER, supra note 63, at 5 (arguing that the Justices disagree 
about their role in determining constitutional meaning and that doctrine about the relationship 
between the Court and other constitutional actors appears to be in the midst of a seismic shift); 
Michael Kent Curtis, Judicial Review and Populism, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 313, 319 (2003) 
(Skepticism about judicial supremacy has its virtues.  So does skepticism about a plan to eliminate 
judicial review.); Edward A. Hartnett, Modest Hope for a Modest Roberts Court: Deference, Facial 
Challenges, and the Comparative Competence of Courts, 59 SMU L. REV. 1735, 1737 (2006) (The 
central question in constitutional adjudication is the degree of deference, if any, that courts give to 
constitutional interpretation by other governmental actors.); Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial 
Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 778 (2002) 
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judicial actor (Congress or the President) has defied a judicial 
interpretation or understanding that the Constitution prohibited some law 
or act.69 
I turn now to a non-exhaustive series of examples of non-extant 
rightslegal controversies involving rights that are nonlaw.  The 
examples vary as to the sources and originators of the purported rights, 
the controlling legal rule maker, the enacting sovereign, and the way 
non-existence has come about.  Three themes unite these disparate 
illustrations.  First, in all cases, the rights asserted, and the duties alleged 
to have been ignored, do not exist as law.  Second, the individuals 
seeking judicial relief will fail on their claims of right.  Third, that failure 
is for a defect in the merits of the claim of right, not for want of subject 
matter jurisdiction in the court.  It is the result of the non-existence as 
law of the substantive rights and correlative duties to be judicially 
enforced with respect to the actors and conduct at issue.70  Under existing 
law, this plaintiff cannot sue this defendant over this conduct.71  The only 
question is whether defeat on the merits will occur at the pleading 
stage,72 at summary judgment,73 or at trial on the merits.74 
                                                                                                                       
([T]he debate over judicial supremacy focuses more squarely on . . . who should make the final 
decision concerning contested [constitutional] interpretations.). 
 69. Larry Sager argues that conflicts over constitutional meaning between the courts and the 
political branches rarely, if ever, take the form of Alpha disputes, in which the Court determines 
some government act or practice to be unconstitutional, but other governmental actors disagree and 
continue those practices.  Lawrence G. Sager, Courting Disaster, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1361, 1364
65 (2005).  Rather, they take the form of Beta disputes, in which the Court finds some government 
act or practice to be constitutional, but other governmental actors disagree and discontinue those 
practices in light of their own constitutional interpretation.  Id.  Historically, Alpha disagreements 
produce direct interbranch conflicts and proposals to jurisdiction-strip, id., although recall that such 
proposals never go anywhere.  Id. at 1368.  But see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous 
Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 22122 (1994) (arguing that the 
President may decline to execute [statutes] on constitutional grounds, even if those grounds have 
been rejected by the courts). 
 70. See Bellia, supra note 58, at 796 (arguing that a plaintiff has a cause of action if the plaintiff 
is entitled to a general remedy for a violation of a right); Clark, supra note 58, at 828 (defining 
successful claim as a series of acts giving rise to a judicially enforceable legal relation of right-
duty); Harrison, supra note 17, at 2521 (arguing that a successful claim requires the plaintiff to plead 
and prove that the defendant acted inconsistently with a duty resting on him toward the plaintiff). 
 71. See Harrison, supra note 17, at 2515. 
 72. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (providing for dismissal of claims for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007) 
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)) (stating that a pleading must give the defendant 
fair notice of the claim and the grounds on which it rests); see also Yazoo County Indus. Dev. Corp. 
v. Suthoff, 454 U.S. 1157, 1161 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) 
(describing Rule 12(b)(6) analysis as looking to whether the complaint presents a claim that can 
form the basis for legal relief). 
 73. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (providing for the rendering of a judgment if there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and the party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law); Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (stating that summary judgment is appropriate against a 
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A. Legislating Narrowly Ex Ante 
A sues B, a small-town mom-and-pop convenience store with five 
employees, for employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.  A performed accounting services as an independent 
contractor for B and alleges she was terminated because of sex, sexual 
orientation, and her left-wing political beliefs.  As claim has several 
defects.  Title VII, as written and interpreted, does not protect 
independent contractors.75  Title VII defines employers subject to the 
statute as only those entities having fifteen or more employees.76 It also 
does not prohibit discrimination because of sexual orientation77 or 
political affiliation.78 
No legal right exists in A against B that was violated in the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence at issue.  A, as an independent contractor, has 
no federal claim-right to be free from discrimination because of sex, 
sexual orientation, or political affiliation at the hands of a small entity.  
Conversely, B, as a small entity, bears no federal legal duty to refrain 
                                                                                                                       
party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 
partys case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial); Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 25051 (1986) (describing standard as whether under the governing law, 
there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of 
Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 484 (1986) 
([T]he intermediate step of summary judgment exists precisely to enable courts to examine the 
factual conclusions of the pleader and determine whether they are supported by sufficient evidence 
to warrant the time and effort of a trial.); Wasserman, supra note 23, at 65354 (describing use of 
summary judgment to preview the merits of plaintiffs claims). 
 74. See Wasserman, supra note 23, at 65455, 663 (describing trial on the merits, usually 
before a jury, as the final stage in the process, where factual disputes are resolved); see also Yazoo 
County Indus. Dev. Corp., 454 U.S. at 1161 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) 
(arguing that trial is for the purpose of deciding disputed issues of material fact). 
 75. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2000) (The term employee means an individual employed by 
an employer . . . .); Farlow v. Wachovia Bank of N.C., N.A., 259 F.3d 309, 316 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(affirming grant of summary judgment because plaintiff was an independent contractor, not an 
employee protected by the statute). 
 76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000).  This limitation came about in two steps.  Congress set the 
threshold at twenty-five employees in 1964, then reduced it to fifteen employees (in a merits 
expansion) in 1972.  See Wasserman, supra note 23, at 644 n.2; see also Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 
126 S. Ct. 1235, 123839 (2006) (holding that quantum-of-employee requirement is an element of 
the plaintiffs claim); Wasserman, supra note 23, at 703 (making same argument). 
 77. See Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2001) (Because the 
evidence produced by [the plaintiff]and indeed, his very claimindicated only that he was being 
harassed on the basis of sexual orientation, rather than because of his sex, the District Court properly 
determined that there was no cause of action under Title VII.).  But see Andrew Koppelman, Why 
Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 203 
(1994) (arguing that stigmatization of gays functions as part of a larger system of social control 
based on gender). 
 78. See Eugene Volokh, Same-Sex Marriage and Slippery Slopes, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1155, 
1188 (2005) (stating that government discrimination based on political affiliation is presumptively 
unconstitutional, but most states do not prohibit it as to private entities). 
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from discriminating against its independent contractors because of their 
sex, sexual orientation, or political affiliation.  B is privileged, or at 
liberty, to act as it wishes, at least as to federal law. 
Although Congress enacted right-creating legislation with Title VII, 
it drafted the legislation, and thus created rights, more narrowly than the 
constitutional and political baseline might have allowed.  As Oliver 
Wendell Holmes recognized, the limits contemplated for the coverage 
of a statute are as significant a part of its purpose as is its affirmative 
thrust.79  Some right to be free from employment discrimination exists 
as law, but not the broader right that A seeks to enforce on the facts, 
actors, and events at hand. 
The narrowness of existing rights often is a product of the legislative 
process, whose rules and structures dictate the content of resulting 
substantive law and the rights created or not created under that law.80  
Legislative opponents may try to kill or drain the force from a proposed 
legal rule throughout the legislative process.81  The response is 
bargaining, amendment, and compromise, often by narrowing the rights 
createdthe rights that will exist as lawto minimize objections and to 
maintain the support of pivotal members of the legislature.82 
The limitations on the rights existing under Title VII reflect this 
process.  Nothing constitutionally prevented Congress from reaching all 
entities engaged in interstate commerce, regardless of size,83 or from 
according rights to independent contractors as well as employees.84  But 
legislators included those limitations for a variety of policy reasonsto 
keep the federal government and federal law away from mom-and-pop 
                                                     
 79. Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 605, 633 (1981). 
 80. See McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory 
Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 18 (1984); Nicole L. Guéron, An Idea Whose Time 
Has Come: A Comparative Procedural History of the Civil Rights Acts of 1960, 1964, and 1991, 104 
YALE L.J. 1201, 1201 (1995) (discussing the influence of procedural mechanisms relied upon by 
members of Congress to transform a legislative aspiration into a binding law of the United States). 
 81. See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative 
History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 
1417, 1435 (2003) (arguing that institutional details of Congress aid opposition legislators); Glen 
Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency Model to Direct 
Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 462 (2003) (arguing that structural filters within the legislative 
process provide a variety of opportunities to defeat proposed legislation). 
 82. See Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 62, at 1216 (arguing that opposition can be seen as 
structuring the processes of legislative bargaining, and that compromise entails leaving 
controversial provisions out or specifically limiting the impact of the policy in ways that appease 
pivotal moderates); Staszewski, supra note 81, at 462. 
 83. See Wasserman, supra note 23, at 68283. 
 84. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000) (prohibiting discrimination because of race in making and 
enforcing contracts, including contracts of employment). 
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businesses in small communities and to avoid imposing new federal 
duties on small businesses less able to bear the costs of compliance.85  
The bills supporters obtained needed support from moderate 
congressional Republicans only by narrowing the right in this way.86 
B. Legislating Narrowly Ex Post 
A, a foreign purchaser of vitamin supplements, sues B, a United 
States-based exporter of supplements, for violations of the federal 
Sherman Antitrust Act87 alleging an anticompetitive effect from Bs 
foreign, non-domestic sales.88  But As claim does not satisfy the Foreign 
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA), which limits the scope of 
federal antitrust law.89  The FTAIA, a 1982 amendment to the Sherman 
Act, changes the general legal rule so that federal antitrust laws shall 
not apply to trade or commerce with foreign nations.90  In other words, 
A has no federal claim-right to be free from restraints on foreign trade by 
B, and B has no federal duty to refrain from conduct that constitutes such 
a restraint in purely foreign, non-domestic trade.  The right-duty 
correlative does not exist as federal law. 
The statute then excepts from the new rule (in other words, leaves 
subject to extant United States law) conduct that would otherwise violate 
federal antitrust law and that has a direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable effect on domestic (other-than-foreign) trade or 
commerce.91  In the end, a federal right exists as law in A to be free from 
restraints on foreign trade, with a corresponding duty on B to refrain 
from such restraints, but only so long as those restraints have some effect 
on domestic interstate commerce. 
                                                     
 85. See 110 CONG. REC. 13,092 (1964) (statement of Sen. Cotton) (If we desire violence, 
bitterness, and hatred among the races in this country, I suggest that we put the Federal Government 
with a club into the livelihood of every small businessman . . . .); id. (arguing that Title VII would 
lead the Federal Government with all of its power, majesty and bureaucracy into the way of dealing 
with a small businessman who can ill afford to protect himself).  But see id. (statement of Sen. 
Morse) (I know of no reason why we should set small businessmen aside and say, You can 
continue discrimination with immunity.). 
 86. See id. at 13,088 (statement of Sen. Humphrey) (emphasizing narrow reach of bill that 
leaves ninety-two percent of employers nationwide uncovered); Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 
81, at 147273 (describing the need to make the bill more palatable to pivotal moderate Republicans, 
leading to amendments ameliorating impact of Title VII on American business). 
 87. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (2004). 
 88. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 158 (2005). 
 89. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000). 
 90. Id.; F. Hoffmann-La Roche, 542 U.S. at 158. 
 91. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(B); F. Hoffmann-La Roche, 542 U.S. at 159. 
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The FTAIA exemplifies a right narrowed into non-existence through 
ex post legislation.  Members of Congress had an opportunity to see how 
courts interpreted and applied the antitrust act and how the rights and 
duties worked in the real world.92  FTAIA was an intentional 
congressional response to federal courts adjudicating Sherman Act 
claims involving wholly foreign anticompetitive conduct and injuries 
having no domestic impact.93  American business, one of the most 
successful organized interests when it comes to seeking legislative 
overrides of judicial decisions,94 had complained about the lack of clarity 
as to what international and foreign conduct was permitted or prohibited 
under these decisions. The amended statute reflected a congressional 
message to American exporters (and to firms doing business abroad) 
that the Sherman Act does not prevent them from entering into business 
arrangements . . . , however anticompetitive, as long as those 
arrangements adversely affect only foreign markets.95  In other words, 
Congress clarified the scope of businesses extant federal duties by 
narrowing them, in turn broadening their extant federal liberties. 
Subsequent narrowing of rights often responds to expansionist 
judicial interpretationsthose that extend statutory rights and duties to 
require those covered (duty-bound) by the act to do, or refrain from 
doing, more than anticipated.96  A subsequent Congress may have 
                                                     
 92. See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 2, at 1020 (Congress is then implicitly invited to 
overrule or modify the courts decisions if Congress decides that they are wrong.); Michael E. 
Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word: Congressional Response to Supreme Court Statutory 
Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 425, 425 (1992) (Thus, when the United States Supreme Court 
interprets a federal statute in a manner repugnant to Congress, the latter may respond by legislatively 
modifying the statute in accordance with its intentions.); Zeigler, supra note 62, at 121 ([I]f 
Congress believes that the courts have made a serious error in interpreting a federal statute, Congress 
can amend it.); see also W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 115 (1991), superseded 
by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (In the domain of statutory 
interpretation, Congress is the master.  It obviously has the power to correct our mistakes . . . .).  
But see Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 2, at 974 n.25 (Congress is often too busy worrying about 
new laws to spend its time supervising and revising judicial (mis)interpretations of the old ones.); 
Tyler, supra note 61, at 140910 (Congress is simply not equipped to react in the normal course to 
most statutory interpretation decisions and [its] track record suggests that its attention to statutory 
decisions is highly inconsistent.). 
 93. See United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 2003) (en 
banc) ([T]here has long been concern about overreaching under our antitrust laws.); see also H.R. 
REP. No. 97-686, 56 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 249091 (1982) (describing 
inconsistency among lower courts as to quantum of domestic effects necessary for foreign business 
conduct to be subject to Sherman Act and the business uncertainty created by those inconsistencies). 
 94. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation 
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 348 (1991) (finding that twenty-six percent of overrides in the survey 
were obtained by organized business or labor interests). 
 95. F. Hoffmann-La Roche, 542 U.S. at 161. 
 96. See Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 62, at 122324; Tyler, supra note 61, at 1392 
(emphasizing the interpretive importance of the legislative deal that brokered the statutory 
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different policy preferences than the enacting Congress, to which 
interpreting courts failed to pay sufficient heed,97 or it may want to 
resolve ambiguities left in the original statute in a different direction than 
judicial decisions interpreting those ambiguities.98  The result of the new 
legal rule is some statutory right-duty correlative existing as law, but it 
looks different from the right-duty correlative existing as law prior to the 
amending legislation. 
C. Legislating Narrowly out of Constitutional Concerns 
A sues B and C, two real-estate brokerage firms, alleging that the 
firms (along with many other actors) conspired to fix prices in the sale of 
New Orleans residential real estate in violation of the federal Sherman 
Antitrust Act.99  B and C argue that their brokerage activities were purely 
local in nature; thus any conspiracy in which they may have participated 
was not in restraint of trade or commerce among the several [s]tates, as 
required by the statute.100  In Hohfeldian terms, B and C argue that, 
because their conduct did not affect commerce among the states, they 
have no federal duty to A to refrain from engaging in conspiracies 
restraining trade, and A has no federal right as to them to be free from 
such conspiracies. 
At first glance, this example is identical to the first two.  The right-
creating statute is drafted narrowly, thus no federal statutory right-duty 
relation exists between A and B on the facts at issue and A has failed to 
show a violation of rights entitling her to relief on the merits.  What is 
potentially different here is that the factual issue that arguably limits As 
rightswhether Bs and Cs conduct was in restraint of commerce 
among the several statesis a so-called jurisdictional element.101  It is 
a statutory factual element that functions as a nexus between the legal 
                                                                                                                       
language . . . as well as any background norms against which the language came into being). 
 97. See Eskridge, supra note 94, at 390 (arguing that the policy expectations of the current 
Congress and President may be more important to a courts interpretation than those of the enacting 
Congress). 
 98. See Rosenkranz, supra note 63, at 2155 (arguing that statutory ambiguity may allow 
majorities to form, as members vote for the bill thinking it means different things, and all willing to 
take their chances in the courts). 
 99. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (2004); McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, 444 U.S. 232, 23435 
(1980). 
 100. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1; McLain, 444 U.S. at 23537.  The Supreme Court ultimately rejected the 
defendants argument at the pleading stage, holding that the allegations and testimony showed that 
the defendants brokerage activities involved an appreciable amount of interstate commerce.  Id. at 
245. 
 101. See id. at 242 (describing effect on commerce as a jurisdictional element of a Sherman Act 
violation). 
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rule and the specific constitutional power under which Congress enacted 
that rule and regulated that conduct.102 
Congress could not legislate under the Commerce Clause against 
conduct that does not affect commerce in some way, a requirement 
usually satisfied when the conduct is part of a class of commercial or 
economic activity.103  By including effect on commerce as an element of 
the statutory claim-right that the plaintiff must plead and prove in every 
case, Congress ensures that the statute cannot be applied beyond the 
reach of its substantive constitutional regulatory power.104  Any 
application of the statute necessarily remains within constitutional 
bounds.  The Constitution is, in a sense, enforced by narrowing the 
scope of the statute.105 
The difference between this and the prior examples is the reason for 
including the limiting element that renders non-extant the broader right.  
The limiting element in the Sherman Act narrows the legal rule to ensure 
the laws constitutionality.  The limiting elements in Title VII or the 
FTAIA narrow the rules as a reflection of discretionary policymaking by 
the enacting legislative majority.  Whether a plaintiff pleads and proves 
any element of a claimregardless of why the element has been 
included in the statuteis a sub-constitutional question of the reach, 
scope, and application of the statute and the right-duty relation it 
establishes.106  A plaintiffs failure to prove any elementjurisdictional 
or policy-basedrepresents a failure of the plaintiff to establish her 
statutory claim-right or the violation of a correlative duty. 
D. Statutory Override of Common Law Rights 
A, an obese young adult suffering from health problems, has been 
eating fast food every day for ten years.  She sues B, a major fast-food 
                                                     
 102. See Adler & Dorf, supra note 14, at 1153 (Congress sometimes chooses to include in its 
statutes a jurisdictional nexusthat is, a requirement that the government prove that the acts to 
which a statute is applied in a given case themselves affect interstate commerce.). 
 103. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
561 (1995), superseded by statute, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 
102-408, § 101(f) [§ 657], 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-369 to -370 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C.A. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2005)); Wasserman, supra note 23, at 679. 
 104. See Adler & Dorf, supra note 14, at 1153 (arguing that whether the jurisdictional nexus is 
satisfied in particular cases is a question about the statutes scope); Stephen Calkins, The 199091 
Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: Toward Greater Certainty, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 632 (1991) 
(arguing that the Acts statutory language limits what Congress did prohibit). 
 105. See Adler & Dorf, supra note 14, at 1122. 
 106. Id. at 1153 (Whether the nexus is satisfied in particular circumstances is a distinct question 
about the statutes scope to be decided only once the statutes existence has been established.). 
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chain, in federal court (on diversity jurisdiction)107 for state-law fraud, 
products liability, and consumer protection, claiming that the company 
used unreasonably unhealthy products in making its food and failed to 
disclose the harmful ingredients and the negative health effects of the 
product.  She seeks to recover medical expenses related to her obesity.108 
Suppose that, while the action is pending, Congress passes, and the 
President signs, the Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 
2005, colloquially, the Cheeseburger Bill.109  This new law protects the 
fast food industry from tort claims alleging that the fat content in fast 
food made it an unsafe product or caused obesity and other health 
problems.110  The bill responded to several tort actions against the fast-
food industry and reflected congressional disapproval of how real-world 
rights had been wielded in courts and congressional desire to limit the 
scope of those rights.111  Suppose B now argues that the new federal law 
requires dismissal of the pending action upon evidence that B is a 
manufacturer of a qualified food product and that plaintiffs claim seeks 
damages relating to obesity and other health problems.112 
The Cheeseburger Bill would have carved a new federal privilege or 
liberty for B, eliminating what had been As extant common law rights 
and Bs extant common law duties.  Some right exists as law, allowing A 
to be free from Bs negligence and defective products and requiring B to 
refrain from subjecting A to either. But that right-duty combination no 
longer exists with respect to the fast food industrys sale of its food 
products and its alleged causation of obesity and health-related harms.  B 
now has a privilege or liberty, grounded in federal law, to engage in 
                                                     
 107. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000). 
 108. See Pelman v. McDonalds Corp., 396 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2005) (reversing dismissal of class 
action alleging violations of New York Consumer Protection Act and common law negligence); 
WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE 
LITIGATION CRISIS 17980 (2004) (describing first, voluntarily dismissed, lawsuit against fast food 
chains for failing to disclose high fat content in food); Richard C. Ausness, Tell Me What You Eat, 
and I Will Tell You Whom to Sue: Big Problems Ahead for Big Food?, 39 GA. L. REV. 839, 841
42 (2005) (same). 
 109. Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2005, H.R. 554, 109th Cong. (2005) 
(as passed by House, Oct. 19, 2005).  In fact, this bill never became law.  It passed the House of 
Representatives in October 2005, but was not acted upon in the Senate by the close of the 109th 
Congress. 
 110. See H.R. 554 §§ 3, 4(5)(A) (prohibiting actions in federal or state court arising out of, or 
related to a persons accumulated acts of consumption of a [defined fast food] product and weight 
gain, obesity, or a health condition).  The bill leaves in place actions for breach of warranty and 
action in which the plaintiff can show a violation of federal law, along with reliance and causation.  
Id. § 4(5)(B). 
 111. See id. § 2(a)(4) ([L]awsuits seeking to blame individual food and beverage providers . . . 
are not only legally frivolous and economically damaging, but also harmful to a healthy America.). 
 112. Id. §§ 3(b), 4. 
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certain business practices, even if those practices cause obesity and other 
health harms.113 
Congress may, by superseding federal legislation, eliminate duties 
imposed by common law and accord B broader liberty to act without 
constraint.  Common law rules exist at the sufferance of the legislature, 
lasting only as long as the legislature approves of the rules and the policy 
choices reflected in common law.114  Legislation in derogation of 
common law rights is disfavored, as reflected in courts demand for a 
clear statement of legislative intent to repeal existing common law 
rules.115  So long as that intent is clear, however, legislation altering or 
eliminating the controlling common law rule is valid. 
Congresss power to preempt state common law through superseding 
federal statutory law lies at the heart of the Supremacy Clause and 
Erie.116  The result of preemption is that state common law rights do not 
exist as law; the only extant legal rule is the federal one and whatever 
rights and duties it grants and imposes, although those rights and duties 
are narrower under the federal rule.117  The most prominent example of 
such preemption is ERISA, which has been held to completely preempt 
                                                     
 113. See id. § 4(5)(B)(i) (exempting from the bill claims for breach of contract or warranty, if 
claims are unrelated to weight gain, obesity, or a health condition associated with . . . weight gain 
and obesity); id. § 4(5)(B)(ii) (exempting claims based on knowing violations of federal or state law 
relating to marketing or advertising, on a showing of reliance and proximate cause). 
 114. See Christopher J. Peters, Adjudicative Speech and the First Amendment, 51 UCLA L. REV. 
705, 769 (2004) (describing the fairly obvious fact that the common law can be overridden by 
legislation because the common law reflects a de facto legislative policy to leave certain fields of 
the law unplowed by legislation); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 272 (1994) 
(In this century, legislation has come to supply the dominant means of legal ordering, and 
circumspection has given way to greater deference to legislative judgments.); GUIDO CALABRESI, A 
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 5 (1982) (Courts, limited to honest interpretations of 
these statutes and committed to legislative supremacy, soon enough began to give them the authority 
they claimed for themselves.). 
 115. See, e.g., Norfolk Redevelopment and Hous. Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 464 
U.S. 30, 3536 (1983) (It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that [t]he 
common law . . . ought not to be deemed repealed, unless the language of a statute be clear and 
explicit for this purpose. (quoting Fairfaxs Devisee v. Hunters Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 
623 (1813)) (alteration in original)); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 561 (1967) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (discussing canon requiring strict construction of statutes in derogation of common law); 
John F. Manning, Continuity and the Legislative Design, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1863, 1873 
(2004) (arguing that the canon . . . explicitly directs courts to resolve doubts against changes in the 
legal status quo). 
 116. U.S. CONST. art. VI (This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof, . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64, 7879 (1938). 
 117. See Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an 
Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Courts Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1168 (2006) (A 
striking number of the most significant preemption cases of the last decade involve claims that 
federal law expressly or impliedly preempts state common law causes of action . . . .). 
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state law claims related to the provision of health insurance, making 
federal law, and the rights-duties it creates, the only extant and 
applicable law.118 
Objections to federal statutory derogation of state common law rights 
boil down to a distrust of legislatures.  Legislatures are perceived to be at 
the mercy of powerful interests who ignore the litigation process and 
send lobbyists into legislative halls seeking exemption from legal rules 
that apply to everyone else and from which the less powerful cannot gain 
similar immunity.119  The Supreme Court has recognized that legislative 
politics pose[] a risk that it may be tempted to use retroactive legislation 
as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals.120 
But that unfairness is overcome by requiring Congress to make its 
intent clear when it abrogates common law rules, thus abrogating rights 
and duties.  This leaves open the possibility that Congress might be 
subject to political repercussions should its legislative choice to exempt 
an industry from ordinary tort liabilityto eliminate the industrys 
extant legal duties and the rights of those harmed by the industryprove 
unpopular. 
E. Narrowed Constitutional Rights 
A, a deputy district attorney, sues B, the district attorney, claiming 
that he was subject to adverse job action for writing numerous letters and 
memoranda, internally and externally, criticizing the offices 
investigation and prosecution of a defendant who A believed was 
innocent.121  The Supreme Court rejects As First Amendment claim for 
damages, holding that, because A was a public employee whose official 
duties involved the type of speech at issue and because A was speaking  
 
 
                                                     
 118. See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004); see also Siegel, supra note 117, 
at 116869 (collecting examples of federal law preempting state law causes of action); cf. Catherine 
Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 
DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 22728 (2007) (describing practice of federal agencies using preambles in 
federal regulations to displace competing or conflicting state common law). 
 119. See David Kairys, Legislative Usurpation: The Early Practice and Constitutional 
Repudiation of Legislative Intervention in Adjudication, 73 UMKC L. REV. 945, 946 (2005) 
(describing concerns for the resulting race of litigants to the assemblies and unfairness to those who 
had little or no influence with the legislatures); id. at 950 (expressing concern for floodgates 
opening for any industry able to muster legislative support to respond to lawsuits with immunity 
bills, rather than meeting the substance of the lawsuit). 
 120. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994). 
 121. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 195556 (2006). 
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pursuant to those official duties, his speech was not constitutionally 
protected from adverse job action.122 
The Constitution, notably the liberty-bearing provisions of the Bill of 
Rights and the Reconstruction Amendments, is a prime positive-law 
source of liberties and claim-rights.123  As Mitchell Berman suggests, the 
First Amendment is best understood as a conjunction of claim-rights and 
liberties.  The First Amendment creates a liberty in A to speak free from 
constraint and a claim-right against the government that it refrain from 
interfering with that liberty, in turn imposing a duty on the government 
to refrain from interfering.124 
The language of these liberty-bearing provisions is sparse and 
broadwhat exactly does freedom of speech or equal protection of 
laws mean?125  Determining meaning demands that someone interpret 
and expound on the bare clauses.  It most frequently is the courts, 
arguably by constitutional design.126  In so expounding, courts determine 
the law that exists as the First Amendment, and the scope of the 
liberties, rights, and duties established by that extant law. 
Under the applicable provision of positive lawthe First 
Amendment as interpreted in Garcettino liberty-right conjunction 
exists for A.  A clearly does not have a claim-right to be free from 
employment-related government sanction for exercising his liberty to 
speak.  Nor is B, acting on behalf of the government, under a duty to 
tolerate or to not interfere with that speech from its employees.  A 
perhaps has liberty to engage in the expression at issue, in the sense that 
he is able to speak.  But he cannot do so with impunity.  If he wishes to 
maintain good standing at his job, he is under a duty to refrain from such 
                                                     
 122. Id. at 1960. 
 123. See SAGER, supra note 63, at 3. 
 124. See FINNIS, supra note 36, at 201; Berman, supra note 35, at 33; supra notes 3845 and 
accompanying text. 
 125. See SAGER, supra note 63, at 36 (calling these very general ideas, ideas whose basic thrust 
and practical extension have been the source of much disagreement); see also David A. Strauss, 
Freedom of Speech and the Common-Law Constitution, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN 
THE MODERN ERA 33, 40 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) ([I]t is not obvious 
what constitutes the freedom of speech.); Staszewski, supra note 20, at 1029 (While there is 
obviously no consensus on the meaning of the equal protection of the laws, it has long been 
recognized that the Equal Protection Clause embodies a principle that similarly situated people 
should be treated alike and differently situated people should be treated differently. (footnote 
omitted)). 
 126. See SAGER, supra note 63, at 71; see also Curtis, supra note 68, at 31516 (arguing that 
James Madison emphasized judicial enforcement and guardianship of rights as a way to make the 
Bill of Rights effective); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of 
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 288 & n.278 (2000) (arguing that judicial enforcement was a 
basis for both Thomas Jefferson and Madison to support a Bill of Rights). 
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critical expressionhis liberty of expression has been effectively 
eliminated. 
F.  Unconstitutional Legislation: Internal Limitations 
A, a female student at a state university, sues B, a fellow student who 
she alleges sexually assaulted her, under the federal Violence Against 
Women Act (VAWA).127  VAWA prohibits crimes of violence 
motivated by gender and provides a private action for damages and 
other relief.128  In Hohfeldian terms, VAWA creates a federal right in A 
to be free from private acts of gender-motivated violence and imposes on 
B a duty to refrain from such acts. 
As claim fails because the Supreme Court invalidates VAWA as 
exceeding the internal constraints on congressional lawmaking power.129  
VAWA exceeds Congresss power under the Commerce Clause130 
because that power focuses solely on the regulation of economic 
activity and Congress cannot legislate against the aggregate effects of 
entirely non-economic activity, such as crimes of violence.131  VAWA 
also exceeds Congresss power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment by 
appropriate legislation,132 running afoul of the time-honored principle 
that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits only state 
action.133  By attempting to make private individuals directly liable for 
                                                     
 127. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 60203 (2000). 
 128. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b), (c) (2000). 
 129. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 
(1803) (Every law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in 
the Constitution.  The powers of the legislature are defined and limited . . . .)); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 592 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing the well-known truth that the 
new Government would have only the limited and enumerated powers found in the Constitution), 
superseded by statute, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 102-408, § 
101(f) [§ 657], 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-369 to -370 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 
922(q)(2)(A) (2005)); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 52 (James Madison) (discussing limitations on 
powers of the House of Representatives). 
 130. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 131. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613, 61718.  See also Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing 
Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 115 (2001) (The Court rewrote the Commerce Clause test . . . . 
[by] emphasizing that the economic aspect of the regulated activity was central to holdings in prior 
decisions . . . .).  Congress retains a limited power to prohibit employment-related gender-motivated 
violence, which likely would constitute sexual harassment under Title VII, because details of 
employee relations are economic and thus within even the narrower Commerce Clause power.  See 
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation 
After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 449 (2000). 
 132. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
 133. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1); see also Samuel 
Estreicher & Margaret H. Lemos, The Section 5 Mystique, Morrison, and the Future of Federal 
Antidiscrimination Law, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 109, 151 (2000) (Rather than acting directly on state 
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violent criminal acts motivated by gender bias, VAWA goes beyond 
Congresss power to halt discrimination and misconduct by state 
officials.134 
As claim fails because the constitutional invalidation of VAWA 
means that the rights established and duties imposed by that provision do 
not exist as federal law.  This is the paradigm for Adler and Dorfs 
argument that Congresss enumerated powers state existence conditions 
for federal legislationsome federal sub-constitutional law exists as 
federal law only if it falls within the proper scope of federal lawmaking 
powers.135  An invalid lawone that is not consistent with the 
constitutional rules that limit federal legislationis nonlaw.136  Because 
VAWA is not constitutionally appropriate given the limits on Congresss 
legislative power, it cannot exist as federal law and the rights VAWA 
created cannot exist as federal rights. 
Judicial rejection of VAWAs statutory rights was grounded not on 
constitutional objection to the rights created, but to the fact of federal, 
rather than state, creation.137  The conclusion that these rights do not exist 
flows from a distinct vision of constitutional structure and which level of 
                                                                                                                       
actors such as prosecutors, judges, policemen, and caseworkers, Congress devised a way to help 
women overcome the effects of state-sponsored bias by suing their attackers themselves.); Post & 
Siegel, supra note 131, at 502 (The Court reaches back to the nineteenth century . . . for the view 
that it would threaten the balance of power between the States and the National Government for 
Congress to regulate the conduct of private actors under the Fourteenth Amendment. (quoting 
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 620)).  Valid legislation under § 5 must have congruence and 
proportionality between the constitutional injury to be remedied and the means adopted to that end.  
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 62526.  A law directed at individuals rather than a State or state actor, the 
Court seemed to suggest, could not be congruent and proportional.  Id. 
 134. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627; see also Estreicher & Lemos, supra note 133, at 157 (arguing 
that the Court seized on the fact that VAWAs penalties were directed against private individuals as 
the distinction that took it beyond the limits of § 5 power); Post & Siegel, supra note 131, at 475 
(arguing that Morrison intimate[s] that even properly remedial Section 5 legislation cannot 
prohibit actions by private individuals); id. at 483 (arguing that Morrison presents a vision of 
federal-state relations which seemingly would prevent Congress from employing Section 5 to 
regulate the conduct of private parties).  Federal law directly regulating purely private conduct 
lacked the congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the 
means adopted to that end required for a law to constitute legislation enforcing (as opposed to 
redefining) Fourteenth Amendment rights. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 62526; see also City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (establishing congruence and proportionality standard as test for § 
5 legislation); Colker & Brudney, supra note 131, at 104. 
 135. Adler & Dorf, supra note 14, at 111920 ([A] constitutional provision is an existence 
condition for that type of law if no proposition can be law of that type unless the provision is 
satisfied.); supra Part II.B. 
 136. See id. at 1129. 
 137. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 620 (stating that limitations on the scope of Congresss power 
under the Fourteenth Amendment are necessary to prevent the Fourteenth Amendment from 
obliterating the Framers carefully crafted balance of power between the States and the National 
Government); Resnik, supra note 2, at 1004 (describing arguments that certain problems . . . 
belong to the states). 
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government should regulate conductwhich level of government should 
grant rights and impose duties on certain actors and conduct.138 
But this says nothing about the validity of a legal rule establishing a 
right in A to be free from private gender-motivated violence and a duty in 
B to refrain from such violence.  The Morrison Court clearly indicated 
that the same right-duty correlative could exist as law under legal rules 
established by a different sovereign.139 
G. Unconstitutional Legislation: External Limitations 
A sues B and C in federal court under the Federal Wiretap Act, which 
prohibits the intentional disclosure of the contents of wire, oral, or 
electronic communications where the discloser knows or has reason to 
know the information was obtained through an unlawful interception.140  
A, an official in a teachers union involved in a high-profile and 
contentious labor dispute, had a telephone conversation about the dispute 
in which, discussing what to do in response to the school boards hard-
line position, she said that the union was gonna have to go to their, their 
homes . . . .  To blow off their front porches, well have to do some work 
on some of those guys.141  The call was intercepted by an unknown 
person and passed along anonymously to B, who in turn passed it to C, a 
radio talk-show host who broadcast the tape.142 
The Supreme Court rejects, on free-speech grounds, As statutory 
claim against both later-disseminators.  The claim is barred by the 
heightened First Amendment protection accorded publication of truthful 
information, lawfully obtained, on a matter of public significance, which 
can be punished only to serve a governmental need of the highest 
order.143  Because neither B nor C had been involved in the initial illegal 
                                                     
 138. See Kramer, supra note 126, at 288 ([T]he Court has apparently made protecting the states 
from Congress one of its top priorities.); Post & Siegel, supra note 131, at 483 (arguing that 
federalism cases present an account of our federal system in which there are large stretches of state 
[and] municipal law free from federal interference). 
 139. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 (describing domestic violence as an area[] of traditional 
state regulation); infra notes 20306 and accompanying text. 
 140. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1)(c), 2520(c)(2) (2000). 
 141. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 51819 (2001); Rodney A. Smolla, Information as 
Contraband: The First Amendment and Liability for Trafficking in Speech, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 
1113 (2002); Howard M. Wasserman, Bartnicki As Lochner: Some Thoughts on First Amendment 
Lochnerism, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 421, 44041 (2006); see also Smolla, supra, at 1144 (describing 
Sopranos talk of getting dese guys). 
 142. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 51819; Smolla, supra note 141, at 1113; Wasserman, supra note 
141, at 441. 
 143. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 52728 (citing Smith v. Daily Mail Publ. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 
(1979)) ([I]f a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance 
 
10 - WASSERMAN FINAL.DOC 1/28/2008  8:18:07 PM 
2008] JURISDICTION, MERITS, AND NON-EXTANT RIGHTS 253 
interception, neither could be subject to damages for subsequently re-
publishing the communication.144  While recognizing a strong 
government interest in protecting the privacy of A and her fellow 
conversant, those concerns give way when balanced against the interest 
in publishing matters of public importance, the truthful information on 
matters of public concern at the core of the freedom of speech.145 
In balancing As statutory rights and B and Cs First Amendment 
liberties (or liberty-right conjunctions146), the latter prevailed.147  We can 
rephrase this in terms of the web of Hohfeldian legal relations.  The 
federal wiretap statute creates in A a privacy right in her electronic, wire, 
and oral communications, imposing a corresponding duty on B and C not 
to intercept or disclose the contents of those communications.  But the 
First Amendment creates in B and C the liberty to publish truthful, 
lawfully obtained information on a matter of public concern.  That liberty 
translates to their having no duty to refrain from publishing.148  That 
liberty is conjoined with a right in B and C to be free from government 
interference with that liberty, imposing a correlative duty on the 
government not to burden B and Cs ability to publish. 
By attempting to impose legal sanctions on B and C for exercising 
that liberty (by granting to A the right to recover civil damages against 
them), the federal government attempted to impose a duty on B and C 
toward A.  In doing so, the federal government breached its own First-
Amendment-imposed duty to B and C not to burden their liberty. 
This is another example of constitutional provisions functioning as 
existence conditions for sub-constitutional law.  The right-creating 
statutory legal rule in the wiretap statute did not exist as law because it 
was inconsistent with a constitutional rulehere, the external limits 
                                                                                                                       
then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need . . . 
of the highest order.); id. at 53334 (The enforcement of [the statute] implicates the core purposes 
of the First Amendment because it imposes sanctions on the publication of truthful information of 
public concern); see also Wasserman, supra note 141, at 441. 
 144. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 52930, 535 ([A] strangers illegal conduct does not suffice to 
remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern.); see also 
Smolla, supra note 141, at 111617 (arguing that the Court assumed that the subject matter of the 
intercepted conversation was a matter of public concern.); Wasserman, supra note 141, at 441. 
 145. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 53334; Wasserman, supra note 141, at 44142. 
 146. See Berman, supra note 35, at 33; supra notes 3845 and accompanying text. 
 147. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling 
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1107 
(2000) ([T]he speech vs. privacy . . . tensions are not tensions between constitutional rights on both 
sides.  The Constitution presumptively prohibits government restrictions on speech and perhaps 
some government revelation of personal information, but it says nothing about interference with 
speech or revelation of personal information by nongovernmental speakers.). 
 148. See Walt, supra note 29 (Likewise, if B has a duty to A to do x, B does not have the 
privilege (liberty) of doing x.). 
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imposed on congressional lawmaking power by the First Amendment.149  
This is consistent with the Framers understanding of rights as 
expressing limits on the sorts of laws that Congress could enact.150  
Congress lacks power to enact a law that infringes on First Amendment 
liberties; thus any purported law that so infringes is nonlaw. 
As statutory claim against B and C, and B and Cs First Amendment 
defense, illustrate the difficulty of characterizing the freedom of speech 
within Adler and Dorfs framework of nonlaw.  The Bartnicki Court at 
several points emphasized that its decision did not threaten the 
constitutional validity of the wiretap law or the ban on unlawfully 
intercepted communications, but only the propriety of the statutes 
application to the circumstances at issuepublication of truthful 
information on a matter of public concern by someone uninvolved in the 
initial illegal interception.151  That sounds like the First Amendment 
functioning as a condition for proper application of extant law to the 
instant defendants.152  But existence conditions operate by functionally 
revising a statute and the rights it creates.  Individual-liberty-bearing 
provisions protect against infringing legal rules and judicial protection of 
those rights entails judicial repeal or revision of constitutionally 
defective rules.153  The First Amendment essentially, if implicitly, 
redefines the statutory anti-disclosure rule, imposing as a narrowing 
statutory element the principle that government cannot burden 
publication of truthful, lawfully obtained information on a matter of 
public concern.154 
                                                     
 149. See Adler & Dorf, supra note 14, at 1120, 1155; Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: 
The Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 13 (1998) 
(Constitutional rights in our own legal world are structured, not as shields around particular actions, 
but as shields against particular rules.). 
 150. See Adler & Dorf, supra note 14, at 116869 ([The Framers] viewed the recitation of 
rights and the enumeration of powers as mutually reinforcing checks that served the interest of 
limiting the reach of government.). 
 151. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 52425 (2001) (The constitutional question before 
us concerns the validity of the statutes as applied to the specific facts of these cases . . . .  The only 
question is whether the application of these statutes in such circumstances violates the First 
Amendment.); id. at 533 ([T]he outcome of these cases does not turn on whether [the statute] may 
be enforced with respect to most violations of the statute without offending the First Amendment.). 
 152. Existence conditions contrast with application conditions, which limit the legal force of 
sub-constitutional law as applied to some facts or circumstances, without invalidating the entire legal 
provision (that is, removing the provision from status as law).  Adler & Dorf, supra note 14, at 1119.  
One might view the First Amendment as stating an application condition, with rights functioning 
simply as shields that deflect weak and medium strength justifications but succumb to very strong 
ones.  Id. at 116162.  See also id. at 1165 (The First Amendment provides some (albeit weak) 
protection to particular speech-acts proscribed under content-neutral laws that may be valid in most 
circumstances.). 
 153. Adler & Dorf, supra note 14, at 116566. 
 154. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 52728; Smith v. Daily Mail Publg Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103.  The First 
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The redrafted statutory ban thus prohibited the knowing disclosure of 
unlawfully intercepted information, except where that information is 
truthful, lawfully obtained information on a matter of public concern. 
Thus stated, B and C were not subject to an extant statutory duty to 
refrain from publishing the content of the intercepted conversations 
because no ban on publishing existed or, in light of the First Amendment, 
constitutionally could exist.  Neither could the privacy rights in A 
purportedly established by that statute exist. 
H. Overlapping Rights and Duties from Distinct Legal Rules 
A, a woman, works as a truck driver for the City of Chicago 
Department of Transportation.  She was subjected to sexual harassment 
by B, one of her fellow employees.  C and D, her supervisors, were 
aware of the harassment but did not take sufficient steps to remedy the 
situation when she complained and actually took action against her 
following her complaints.  A files suit against the City, B, C, and D.  She 
asserts a claim of sexual harassment under Title VII against the City, 
claims of Equal Protection and First Amendment violations against the 
City and the individual defendants, and several state tort law claims 
against all defendants.155 
Here we have one series of related conduct and occurrences 
involving multiple actors, implicating several distinct right-creating legal 
rules emanating from distinct sovereigns and sources.  Conduct that 
creates a sexually hostile work environment is discrimination because 
of sex prohibited by Title VII, including by public employers.156  
Discrimination because of sex by local government and local 
government officials and employees also violates the Equal Protection 
                                                                                                                       
Amendment overrides tort law. and tort law right-duty correlatives, in a similar manner.  For 
example, the actual malice standard of New York Times redefines defamation by constitutionally 
imposing a state-of-mind requirement that the plaintiff must prove in order to prevail on her claim.  
See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 27980 (1964) (imposing a federal rule that 
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his 
official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malicethat is, with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not); Paul A. 
LeBel, Defamation and the First Amendment: The End of the Affair, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 779, 
783 (1984) (arguing that defamation is the first tort in which, as a federal constitutional matter, 
wrongful conduct by the defendant has been made an essential element of the plaintiffs prima facie 
case.). 
 155. Valentine v. City of Chicago, 452 F.3d 670, 676 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 156. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (2000) (defining persons to include governments and governmental 
agencies); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) (prohibiting discrimination in employment because of 
sex); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 767 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing sexual harassment as prohibited discrimination because of sex). 
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Clause and is actionable under § 1983.157  Retaliation against an 
employee for complaining about sexual harassment violates Title VII, 
and, if it is a public employee, it also violates the First Amendment and 
becomes actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.158  States also have a range 
of tort rules that could be violated by the actors and conduct at issue. 
Substantive rights existing by virtue of different provisions of federal 
and state law are complementary, rather than exclusive, of one another, 
with the plaintiff holding the option as to which set of rights, duties, and 
liberties she wishes to enforce.159  At a general level, all these legal rules 
together provide A with one rightto be free from discrimination and 
harassment because of sex in her public employment.  But distinct legal 
rules create subtly distinct rights.  More importantly, they impose subtly 
distinct duties on different actors. 
For example, only the employer, here the City, bears a Title-VII-
imposed duty not to discriminate because of sex; individual employees 
and supervisors do not.160  The contours of the Citys duty under Title 
VII depend on whether the complained-of harassment came from a 
supervisor or fellow employee,161 and whether the harassment resulted in 
a tangible employment action, such as termination, or whether the 
harassment created a hostile environment.162 
                                                     
 157. Valentine, 452 F.3d at 682 (quoting Bohen v. City of E. Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1185 (7th 
Cir. 1986)). 
 158. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000). See, e.g., Konits v. Valley Stream Cent. High Sch. Dist., 
394 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that any use of state authority to retaliate against those 
who speak out against discrimination suffered by others, including witnesses or potential witnesses 
in proceedings addressing discrimination claims, can give rise to a cause of action under . . . the First 
Amendment.); Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d 597, 60809 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that individuals 
complaint of racial discrimination was speech on a matter of public concern and retaliation for 
complaint allowed claim of First Amendment violation). 
 159. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (holding that federal constitutional claim for 
damages is supplementary to state tort claims for damages from the identical conduct), overruled on 
other grounds by Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978). 
 160. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000) (defining employer as a person engaged in an industry 
affecting commerce having a minimum number of employees over a time period); Indest v. Freeman 
Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that individual employees cannot be 
held liable under Title VII); Miller v. Maxwells Intl, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 58788 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(same); Julie A. Seaman, Form and (Dys)Function in Sexual Harassment Law: Biology, Culture, 
and the Spandrels of Title VII, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 321, 427 (2005) (discussing overwhelming weight 
of authority that only the employer, not individual harassers, are liable under Title VII). 
 161. An employer is vicariously and strictly liable for harassment by supervisors, but only liable 
for fellow-employee harassment of which it knew or should have known and about which it did 
nothing.  Seaman, supra note 160, at 42729. 
 162. The employer is absolutely liable for supervisory discrimination resulting in a tangible 
employment action, such as termination, but has an affirmative defense in a hostile environment case 
that the employer acted reasonably to prevent and correct sexually harassing behavior and that the 
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventive and corrective opportunities.  Id. at 
428. 
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On the other hand, although the city and individual employers all 
may be liable for Equal Protection violations, their duties under § 1983 
and the Constitution have different scopes.  The City is duty-bound only 
to refrain from enacting unconstitutional policies or from knowingly 
permitting widespread unconstitutional practices that are so permanent 
and well-settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of 
law.163  Absent such policy or custom, A holds no claim-right against 
the City, and the City bears no duty, under this provision of federal law, 
to A.164 
Individual employees B, C, and D all bear individual duties to refrain 
from intentionally gender-discriminatory conduct.  But those duties 
extend only to conduct committed as state actors or under color of state 
lawthat is, only if B, C, and D misused power possessed by virtue of 
state law and made possible only because the[y] . . . [were] clothed with 
the authority of state law.165  In other words, they are under no 
enforceable federal duty to refrain from identical gender-discriminatory 
conduct if they are not state actors at the time they engage in it.166 
IV. TARGETING JURISDICTION OR TARGETING RIGHTS? 
The reach and scope of federal judicial activity and influence can be 
constrained by jurisdiction stripping or by the non-existence as law of 
rights and duties.167  Either apparently produces the same effectfewer 
successful actions will be brought in federal court to vindicate individual 
federal rights, arguably depriving courts of the opportunity to perform 
their central and essential constitutional function.168  There is a symbiotic 
                                                     
 163. Monell, 436 U.S. at 69091 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 16768 
(1970)). 
 164. See Valentine v. City of Chicago, 452 F.3d 670, 68182 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding issues of 
fact requiring trial as to Citys potential liability under Title VII); id. at 685 (finding no factual issues 
as to Citys potential liability for some of plaintiffs constitutional claims). 
 165. Id. at 682 (quoting Honaker v. Smith, 256 F.3d 477, 48485 (7th Cir. 2001)); see also 
NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 
(1941)). 
 166. See Valentine, 452 F.3d at 68283 (considering whether individual defendants acted under 
color of law). 
 167. See Resnik, supra note 19, at 2613 (Jurisdictional grants, restrictions, and decisional rules 
(be they cast in terms of causes of action, removing categories of cases from Article III 
oversight, . . .) are the next template on which to examine court-Congress relations.); supra Part III. 
 168. See REDISH, supra note 3, at 96 ([T]oday the primary function of the federal courts is 
generally thought to be the adjudication and protection of federal rights . . . .); Paul Mishkin, The 
Federal Question in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 157 (1953) (arguing that, with 
the expansion of federal legislation, the exercise of power over federal claims constitutes one of the 
major purposes of a full independent system of national trial courts); Judith Resnik, History, 
Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts: Changing Contexts, Selective Memories, and Limited 
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relationship between the two.  Expansion of substantive rights carries 
with it an expansion of judicial competence to enforce rights, while 
contraction of substantive rights means the contraction of judicial 
competence.169 
Perhaps the limits on legal rules that render rights non-extant can, as 
Louise Weinberg suggests, loosely but realistically be described as 
limits on judicial jurisdiction.170  Jurisdiction goes beyond the 
rigorously narrow technical concept, as does the concept of stripping 
or limiting jurisdiction.171  It makes no difference, the argument goes, 
whether we speak of limits on substantive rights and causes of action or 
restrictions on jurisdiction.172 
This is true if we focus solely on effect on the federal docket.  All 
these rules impose door-closing and access-limiting restrictions on 
federal court decision making.173  The party seeking judicial vindication 
and remedy for a federal legal right loses in either case, removing the 
case from the docket.174  The difference is whether the party loses on the 
merits or because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.175 
                                                                                                                       
Imaginations, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 171, 22627 (1995) (describing federal claims as the very kind of 
jurisdiction that many today assume to be the quintessential federal moment); Siegel, supra note 
117, at 1123 (criticizing Rehnquist Court decisions that ignore[] or downplay[] . . . the historic role 
of the federal courts in insuring that remedial schemes are sufficient to protect federal rights); see 
also Sager, supra note 3, at 43 ([T]he jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review state conduct 
cannot be reduced to a point where effective federal judicial supervision of that conduct is no longer 
available.); Hart, supra note 3, at 1365 ([E]xceptions must not be such as will destroy the essential 
role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan.). 
 169. See Weinberg, supra note 13, at 140910 (arguing that the dockets of the federal courts 
swell whenever Congress enacts yet another new law giving rise to new federal rights). 
 170. Id. at 140708. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See Resnik, supra note 19, at 2593, 2613; Resnik, supra note 2, at 979 (describing 
objections to new causes of action through arguments about special character and import of federal 
courts); Weinberg, supra note 13, at 140708; see also Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 2, at 1034 
([I]t is far more typical for the Court to exercise jurisdiction while applying substantive legal tests 
that leave political actors free to choose their course of action without any realistic threat of judicial 
intercession.); Siegel, supra note 117, at 1115 (discussing Rehnquist Courts hostility to litigation 
that comes across as an overt inclination to close the courts to particular kinds of claims or 
claimants, at other times as skepticism about doctrinal innovations that might have the immediate or 
second-order consequence of facilitating litigation). 
 173. Weinberg, supra note 13, at 1408; see also Resnik, supra note 19, at 2593 (arguing that 
limitations on decision making by Article III judges come, in part, from cases not often 
characterized as about Article III but denominated as about congressional commerce clause 
powers). 
 174. See Clark, supra note 49, at 1462 (arguing that if there is no law to apply, federal courts 
should rule against the party who bears the burden of persuasion on the question at issue). 
 175. Important procedural consequences follow from the difference between a loss on the merits 
and a loss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506
07 (2006) (describing differences between lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a 
claim on the merits); Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Substantiality, 42 TULSA L. 
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But differences emerge when focus shifts to other considerations.  I 
argued previously that something fundamentally different occurs
conceptually, analytically, procedurally, and politicallywhen legal rule 
makers create enforceable substantive rights (and impose enforceable 
substantive duties) as opposed to granting subject matter jurisdiction.176  
It follows that something fundamentally different occurs when the result 
of the process of legal rule making is the non-existence of enforceable 
rights as opposed to the limitation or elimination of subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
We must recognize and distinguish situations in which Congress has 
targeted the jurisdiction of the courts from situations in which legal rule 
makers have targeted the scope of extant Hohfeldian claim-rights, duties, 
and liberties.  Differences between jurisdiction and merits become clear 
when viewed through the lens of differences between true jurisdiction 
strips and claims asserted on non-extant rights. 
A. Remainders 
The first difference is what remains in the wake of a legal rule that 
strips jurisdiction as opposed to a rule that renders rights non-extant.  
The distinction focuses on those real-world actors to whom rights and 
privileges have been given and on whom duties have been imposed. 
In the wake of a true jurisdiction strip, federal rights remain in place 
and enforceable.  But they are not enforceable in federal court.  For 
example, even if federal courts are stripped of the power to adjudicate 
challenges to government acknowledgement of God as the sovereign 
source of law, liberty, or government,177 there nevertheless remains a 
right, grounded in the First Amendments Establishment Clause, not to 
be confronted or coerced by government displays or acts that have the 
purpose or effect of endorsing religion or coercing participation in 
religious activities.178  And there remains in place a governmental duty 
                                                                                                                       
REV. 579, 59699 (2007) (describing the formalist and procedural distinctions between analysis of 
jurisdiction and analysis of merits). 
 176. Wasserman, supra note 23, at 66970. 
 177. See Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, S. 520, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 178. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992) (A state-created orthodoxy puts at grave 
risk that freedom of belief and conscience which are the sole assurance that religious faith is real, not 
imposed.); id. (discussing concern for subtle coercive pressure of government-sponsored 
religious activities); County of Allegheny v. ACLU of Greater Pittsburgh, 492 U.S. 573, 601 (1989) 
([B]y prohibiting government endorsement of religion, the Establishment Clause prohibits precisely 
what occurred here: the governments lending its support to the communication of a religious 
organizations religious message.); see also McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 88283 
(2005) (holding that display of Ten Commandments in public courthouse violated Establishment 
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not to erect displays or conduct ceremonies coercing or endorsing 
religion.  The jurisdiction strip only incidentally affects holders of 
federal rights by depriving them of one forum (albeit the historically best 
forum) in which to vindicate those rights.  Other forums, namely state 
courts, remain.179 
By contrast, if no real-world right exists as law, then no federal real-
world duty exists as law to be enforced in any court, federal or state.  All 
that remains is a power in B to act against A (and others), immune from 
restraint or obligation to the giant.  Such rules do not shift cases among 
judicial forums; they eliminate cases (or at least successful cases) 
altogether.180 
The result of the Morrison Court striking down VAWA is that there 
is (and can be) no federal right to be free from private, non-employment-
related gender-motivated violence and no federal duty to refrain from 
such violence.181  The result of Title VIIs limitations on the definition of 
employer means there is no federal right to be free from race or sex 
discrimination in employment if one works for a company with fewer 
than fifteen employees; and, conversely, no federal duty to refrain from 
such discrimination is imposed on a company with fewer than fifteen 
employees.182  The result of the First-Amendment analysis in Garcetti is 
that a public employee does not enjoy liberty to engage in certain 
expression with job-related impunity.183  These right-duty correlatives do 
not exist, and thus are not enforceable in any court, federal or state. 
                                                                                                                       
Clause); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (striking down school district 
program of student-led prayer prior to football games); County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 60102 
(holding that display of crèche in county building violated Establishment Clause). 
 179. See Bator, supra note 79, at 62829 (The state courts do constitute an ultimate protection 
against tyrannous government.); Gunther, supra note 1, at 920 (Congress merely relies on the state 
courts to enforce federal rights, part of their traditional, originally contemplated role . . . .); Hart, 
supra note 3, at 1364 (arguing that the consequence is merely to force proceedings to be brought, if 
at all, in a state court); Sager, supra note 3, at 42 (arguing that jurisdiction stripping in the end 
offers Congress only the mean solace of pushing cases from one judicial bailiwick into another); 
Weinberg, supra note 13, at 1415 ([A]s long as there is access to state courts for enforcement of 
federal law, the question [of jurisdiction stripping] cannot have much bite.); see also Pfander, supra 
note 12, at 237 (arguing that jurisdiction-stripping bills confer exclusive original jurisdiction on state 
courts).  But see Gerhardt, supra note 11, at 128283 (arguing that jurisdiction-stripping proposals 
will allow state courts to completely circumvent, narrow, and effectively overrule what the Court 
has already said about these or similar claims). 
 180. See Siegel, supra note 117, at 1175 (arguing that only stripping a party of a right to bring a 
civil action can ensure that a plaintiff will be unable to find a judicial forum favorable to her claim). 
 181. See supra Part III.F. 
 182. See supra Part III.A. 
 183. See supra Part III.E. 
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B. Jurisdiction of Whom to Do What 
Difficulty in separating legal rules stripping jurisdiction from those 
diminishing substantive rights stems, in part, from confusion over the 
meaning of jurisdiction, that word of many, too many meanings.184  
Evan Tsen Lee defines jurisdiction as something like legitimate 
authority.185  But any governmental body, not only courts, can wield 
legitimate authority.  The question is legitimate authority in whom to 
do what? 
This raises the critical distinction between judicial jurisdiction of the 
federal courts and legislative (or prescriptive) jurisdiction of Congress.  
The latter is the authority to legislate, to regulate particular real-world 
actors and conduct by prescribing prospective legal rules of general 
applicability.186  The former is the raw adjudicative power of the courts, 
the authority to hear, decide, and resolve legal and factual disputes 
arising under those legal rules.187  It is, in Lawrence Sagers words, the 
motive force of a court, the root power to adjudicate a specified set of 
controversies.188  In Hohfeldian terms, legislative jurisdiction is power 
to prescribe legal rules creating rights and imposing duties, while judicial 
jurisdiction is power to provide the adjudicative forum to resolve 
allegations that those duties have been ignored and rights violated. 
Confusion between jurisdictional types leads to inappropriate 
distinctions between the effect and treatment of jurisdictional and policy-
based statutory elements.  In Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., the Court was 
correct in insisting that statutory elements go to substantive merits unless 
                                                     
 184. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510 (2006). 
 185. Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1613, 1620 (2003). 
 186. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that legislative jurisdiction . . . . refers to the authority of a state to make its law 
applicable to persons or activities) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 231 (1987)); United Phosphorus Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 
942, 953 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Wood, J., dissenting) (describing jurisdiction to prescribe a rule 
of law); Kulick v. Pocono Downs Racing Assn, 816 F.2d 895, 898 (3d Cir. 1987) (describing 
Congresss constitutional authority to act); Leonard, supra note 56, at 280 (Congress substantive 
authority to legislate within its constitutional ambit entails the power to create or to refuse to create 
causes of action.). 
 187. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004) (defining jurisdiction as the 
power of the courts to entertain cases concerned with a certain subject); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 
228, 239 n.18 (1979) (defining jurisdiction as a question of whether a federal court has the power, 
under the Constitution or laws of the United States, to hear a case); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 
528, 538 (1974) (defining jurisdiction as essentially the authority conferred by Congress to decide a 
given type of case one way or the other); Lee, supra note 185, at 1620 (defining jurisdiction as 
legitimate authority). 
 188. Sager, supra note 3, at 22. 
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Congress provides otherwise.189  But the Court failed to address the 
continued validity of prior cases in which it at least was suggested that 
the failure of a jurisdictional element (such as agreement in restraint of 
trade or commerce among the several states under antitrust laws190) 
might affect judicial jurisdiction despite the absence of a clear statement 
designating the element as jurisdictional.191  Properly understood, 
jurisdictional elements simply designate the link between what conduct 
Congress did regulate and what conduct Congress could regulate, 
keeping the former within the bounds of the latter; that has everything to 
do with prescriptive jurisdiction and nothing to do with judicial 
jurisdiction.192 
As I have argued previously, the effects of non-satisfaction of any 
element are identical: the plaintiff has failed to prove a breach of the 
rights created and duties imposed by a statutory rule and the plaintiffs 
claim of right fails on its merits.193  That is so whether the narrowness of 
the right results from a limiting jurisdictional element,194 a limiting 
policy-based element included in the original enactment,195 or a limiting 
policy-based element added in subsequent legislation responding to 
expansive judicial interpretation and application of the original statutory 
rule.196 
The 1995 Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts demonstrates the 
problematic conflation of jurisdictional types.197  The report describes a 
                                                     
 189. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516 ([W]hen Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on 
coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.); 
Wasserman, supra note 175, at 582 (arguing that, after Arbaugh, statutory factual issues go to the 
merits unless Congress explicitly provides otherwise); Wasserman, supra note 23, at 693 (The 
elements of the underlying statutory claim . . . provide the exclusive focus of . . . [the] merits 
analysis.). 
 190. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (2004); McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 242 
(1980) (labeling effect on commerce as a jurisdictional element); Calkins, supra note 104, at 632 
(arguing that the statutory language limits what Congress did prohibit). 
 191. See McLain, 444 U.S. at 246 (What was submitted shows a sufficient basis for satisfying 
the [Sherman] Acts jurisdictional requirements under the effect-on-commerce theory . . . .); Hosp. 
Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 742 n.1 (1976) ([O]ur analysis in this case would be 
no different if we were to regard the District Courts action as having been a dismissal for want of 
subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).  In either event, the critical inquiry is into the 
adequacy of the nexus between respondents conduct and interstate commerce that is alleged in the 
complaint.); supra Part III.C. 
 192. See Calkins, supra note 104, at 632 (arguing that concerns for what Congress did regulate 
or could regulate do not limit the power of federal courts to hear cases properly initiated); supra 
notes 10306 and accompanying text. 
 193. See Wasserman, supra note 23, at 687. 
 194. See supra Part III.C. 
 195. See supra Part III.A. 
 196. See supra Part III.B. 
 197. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL 
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dispute between those who favor increased federalization of the law 
against those who favor limiting federal court jurisdiction.198  But 
increasing federalization of the law is not the antithesis of limiting 
jurisdiction.  Federalizing the law sounds in an expansion of substantive 
law, entailing increased exercise of Congresss prescriptive jurisdiction 
imposing new federal statutory rights and duties.  That may, but need 
not, affect the judicial jurisdiction of the courts. 
Commentators such as Judith Resnik often discuss the existence or 
non-existence of federal legal norms, and thus of federal rights and 
duties, as granting or repealing federal jurisdiction.199  That is accurate 
as a discussion of federal prescriptive jurisdictionthe constitutional 
power (and wisdom) of Congress enacting rights-creating legislation and 
enforcing particular norms as matters of federal law.200  A more precise 
description is that Congress pulls issues into the federal net by 
wielding its authority to make an array of issues federal and to 
regulate a broad range of activities and behaviors.201 
But that debate is about how much real-world conduct Congress can 
or should regulate; it is only incidentally about increasing or decreasing 
the federal courts dockets.202  Morrison, for example, ultimately turned 
on the Courts understanding that the conduct at issueprivate, non-
employment-related acts of gender-motivated violenceis to be 
regulated by local, rather than federal, rule makers.203  Congress cannot 
regulate (that is, assert prescriptive jurisdiction over) some conduct, the 
argument goes, because certain problems should not become federal 
cases but belong to the states.204  But the Morrison Court did not reject 
the basic idea of a right-duty correlative with respect to private gender-
motivated violence.  Rather, state and local government, not the United 
States, is the appropriate sovereign to establish the right-creating legal 
rulewhether through a VAWA-like right to be free from gender-
                                                                                                                       
COURTS, reprinted in 166 F.R.D. 49 (1995) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN]. 
 198. Id. at 66; see also Resnik, supra note 19, at 261920 (describing the Plans criticism of 
Congress and calls for restraint in creating new federal causes of action on issues previously 
resolved in state courts). 
 199. Resnik, supra note 2, at 979. 
 200. Id. at 97980; see also Resnik, supra note 19, at 2620; supra notes 18692 and 
accompanying text. 
 201. Resnik, supra note 2, at 100406 & n.323; id. at 980 (Federal jurisdictional discussions 
thus became a means by which to enact conflict about legal rules.). 
 202. See id. at 1004. 
 203. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549, 561 (1995), superseded by statute, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. 
L. No. 102-408, § 101(f) [§ 657], 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-369 to -370 (1996) (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q)(2)(A)(2005)). 
 204. Resnik, supra note 2, at 1004 (discussing LONG RANGE PLAN). 
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motivated violence,205 or through a similar right via common law rules of 
assault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.206 
Importantly, claims on these state-created rights actually may fall 
within the adjudicative jurisdiction of the federal courts.  A plaintiff 
could bring her state-law claim in federal court if, for example, it falls 
within the courts diversity jurisdiction, where victim and attacker are 
from different states and the action is for more than $75,000.207  The 
federal court would apply state law to determine the rights and duties in 
that case.208 
But that drives home the point: the issue is which sovereign (federal 
or state) asserts the legitimate authority to prescribe applicable 
substantive rules creating rights and imposing dutiesin other words, 
who can or will assert prescriptive jurisdiction.  The issue is not whether 
federal courts can assert judicial jurisdiction to provide the adjudicative 
forum, resolve legal and factual issues, and vindicate rights. 
This division of prescriptive jurisdiction occurs between sovereigns.  
It also may occur between different rule makers within a single 
sovereign.  Willingness of one rule maker to enact a right-creating rule 
affects the need for, or willingness of, a different rule maker to do the 
same.  For example, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the civil rights 
movement sought to use the courts to establish a right of access to 
privately owned places of public accommodation through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.209  But that right could exist only if the Court relaxed the 
state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983.210  
By 1963, the Court had reached an impasse in its effort to establish a 
single standard for when and how private conduct might constitute state 
action for purposes of constitutional duty.211  Unable to fully establish the 
                                                     
 205. See, e.g., NEW YORK, NY, ADMIN. CODE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK tit. 8, ch. 9 (2000). 
 206. See Ellen M. Bublick, Tort Suits Filed by Rape and Sexual Assault Victims in Civil Courts: 
Lessons for Courts, Classrooms and Constituencies, 59 SMU L. REV. 55, 5859, 7172 (2006) 
(describing increasing numbers of state tort claims stemming from sexual assaults, using a wide 
range of common law and statutory causes of action).  Of course, the right-duty correlative under 
common law assault or battery is not identical to the right-duty correlative under VAWA. 
 207. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000) (granting district courts original jurisdiction over civil 
actions, inter alia, between citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds 
$75,000). 
 208. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 209. See Post & Siegel, supra note 131, at 488 (arguing that the federal courts became clogged 
with thousands of suits by protesters challenging Jim Crow laws). 
 210. Id. at 49798 (Throughout the 1960s the Court was under intense pressure to relax the 
state action requirement for judicial enforcement of Section 1 [of the Fourteenth Amendment].). 
 211. See Joel K. Goldstein, Constitutional Dialogue and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1095, 110001 (2005) (describing views of Justices as to reach of Fourteenth 
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right to equality through the courts and the Constitution, civil-rights 
advocates turned to a different rule maker (Congress) and a different 
source of rights (statutory law).212  But all remain right-duty correlatives 
established by the federal sovereign.213 
In turn, as Robert Post and Reva Siegel argue, the enactment of civil-
rights legislation prohibiting discrimination by non-state actors214 
reduced the pressure on the Court to liberalize the state-action 
requirement or to broaden constitutionally based rights and duties.215  
Because there was an alternative source of extant positive federal law 
establishing equality rights, the Court could (and did) narrow the scope 
of extant constitutional rights, secure in the belief that congressional 
legislation would provide relatively full implementation of 
antidiscrimination norms.216 
C. Litigation or Jurisdiction 
At the heart of the separation between judicial jurisdiction and 
substantive rights is a distinction between jurisdiction and litigation.  
That distinction lies at the heart of the separation between legal rules that 
strip jurisdiction and those that render non-extant substantive rights and 
duties. 
Jurisdiction is a courts root power to adjudicate legal and factual 
disputes brought before it by parties.217  Litigation is the broad process of 
judicial dispute resolution.  It includes within it decision[s] by particular 
individuals or groups to resolve problems and [to] seek redress through 
formal application to the courts, [as well as a] complex of individuals, 
institutions, and practices through which such disputes are [resolved].218  
Andrew Siegel argues that litigation is a social institutiona complex 
of cultural attitudes about problem solving, institutional arrangements, 
                                                                                                                       
Amendment). 
 212. Id. at 1097 (arguing that the political branches commenced a constitutional dialogue that 
resulted in a political resolution of the question (footnote omitted)); see Post & Siegel, supra note 
131, at 498 & n.267. 
 213. The result is that an individuals rights may be protected or not protected by a combination 
of federal right-creating provisions, constitutional and statutory. See supra Part III.H. 
 214. That is, creating a right to be free from discrimination by certain private actors and a duty in 
such private actors not to discriminate. 
 215. See Post & Siegel, supra note 131, at 51718. 
 216. Id. at 518.  See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding that 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only intentional discrimination); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 
419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974) (holding that privately owned and operated utility company, although 
subject to pervasive state regulation, was not a state actor bound by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 217. See supra notes 18788 and accompanying text. 
 218. Siegel, supra note 117, at 1114. 
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doctrinal rules, and professional roles that nourish our particular 
judicially focused dispute-resolution system.219 
Litigation and jurisdiction are not mutually exclusive and there 
certainly is overlap.  Jurisdictional rules are part of the practices through 
which disputes are resolved.  Stripping federal courts of jurisdiction is 
one way to control and limit litigation, at least in federal courts.  
Diminishing existing real-world rights, liberties, and duties is another 
way to reduce the amount of federal litigation (or, from the plaintiffs 
standpoint at least, the amount of successful federal litigation).  But a 
change, in either direction, in the amount of litigation does not 
necessarily equate to a change in the amount of federal jurisdiction, in 
the sense of the quantum of raw adjudicative authority. 
For purposes of § 1331s grant of general federal question 
jurisdiction, the term arising under federal law has come to mean one 
of two things: (1) the plaintiffs claim of right was created by or founded 
directly on or made possible by federal law, where federal law creates a 
cause of action and substantive right to a remedy for violation of that 
national rule220 or (2) the outcome of the case turns on the construction or 
application of a provision of federal constitutional or statutory law, with 
one construction entitling the plaintiff to relief and the other depriving 
her of that relief.221  Either standard is satisfied in the main run of cases 
seeking to recover on rights existing under a federal constitutional or 
statutory provision, such as Title VIIa claim of federally created right 
asserted in a federally created cause of action over which Congress 
intended to grant federal jurisdiction.222 
                                                     
 219. Id. 
 220. See Wasserman, supra note 23, at 69497 (compiling various definitions offered by courts 
and commentators); see also, e.g., Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 377 (2004) 
(describing requirement that claim be made possible by an applicable federal statute); Smith v. 
Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 214 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ([A] suit cannot 
be said to arise under any other law than that which creates the cause of action.); Am. Well Works 
Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (Holmes, J.) (arguing that a suit arises under 
federal law where that law creates the cause of action). 
 221. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Envt 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (stating that a 
claim arises under federal law where the plaintiff wins under one conceivable construction of federal 
law and loses under another); Gully v. First Natl Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936) (Cardozo, J.) 
(The right or immunity must be such that it will be supported if the Constitution or laws of the 
United States are given one construction or effect, and defeated if they receive another.); REDISH, 
supra note 3, at 105 (arguing that a case arises under federal law if the outcome of the case may 
turn on construction of federal law); Donald L. Doernberg, Theres No Reason for It; Its Just Our 
Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question 
Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 65657 (1987) (emphasizing the presence of federal issues 
whose decision one way will necessarily cause a result in the case, and whose decision the other 
way will tend to prevent it). 
 222. See REDISH, supra note 3, at 96 (As a practical matter, the overwhelming majority of 
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This jurisdictional structure is significant in that once a legal rule 
maker creates a federal right, a right-holder can vindicate that right in 
federal court against the actor who breached his duties without Congress 
having to do or say anything further about judicial jurisdiction.223  The 
court possesses root power to hear and resolve substantive legal and 
factual issues brought before it; it merely awaits the bringing of those 
claims by right-holders.  That power remains unless and until Congress 
affirmatively divests courts of it. 
That quantum of adjudicative authority is unchanged by the non-
existence as law of substantive federal rights.  Non-existence of rights 
means fewer real-world actors and less real-world conduct are subject to 
federal legal protection or federal legal constraint.  There are fewer 
federal right-holders, fewer federal duty-bound actors, and less conduct 
subject to federal legal constraint, suit, and liability.  But courts remain 
open for business, empowered to hear and resolve whatever claim-rights 
do exist as federal law and are brought before them.224 
General federal question jurisdiction is akin to potential energyit is 
power, waiting to be released when acted upon by an outside force.  For 
the federal courts, that outside force is parties bringing civil actions 
alleging injury and seeking relief under a right-creating federal legal 
norm.  To the extent fewer parties do so because of reductions in the 
quantum of enforceable federal right-creating law, the courts may face a 
reduced caseload.  Or courts may simply enter fewer judgments on the 
merits in favor of plaintiffs, as claims of right fail because no enforceable 
legal right exists.  But courts have not lost any of their root power to hear 
and resolve legal and factual issues.  They merely are exercising that 
power less frequently. 
                                                                                                                       
actual cases fall either clearly within or without the federal question statute.); William Cohen, The 
Broken Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise Directly Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. 
REV. 890, 90506 (1967) (The bulk of federal civil litigation in the federal courts presents no 
jurisdictional problem.); Wasserman, supra note 175, at 58990; Wasserman, supra note 23, at 
69798. Much of the confusion over arising under comes where state law creates the cause of 
action, but a substantial federal question is present within the case.  See Grable & Sons v. Darue 
Engg & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005); Wasserman, supra note 175, at 586 n.59. 
 223. See Pfander, supra note 12, at 224 (When Congress creates a new federal cause of 
action . . . state and federal courts can both hear the claims.). 
 224. See Wasserman, supra note 23, at 67677 (arguing that Congress establishes jurisdiction 
on an understanding that extant or future statutes enacted under its substantive powers . . . provide a 
cause of action that federal courts now are empowered to hear); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 
542 U.S. 692,  714 (2004) (stating that the Alien Tort Statute provided courts with jurisdiction to 
adjudicate whatever rights were established by federal common law incorporating principles of 
international law). 
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Much has been written about the federal litigation explosion that 
began in the 1970s.225  But it is noteworthy that the trigger for that 
explosion was not the grant of general federal question jurisdiction, 
which occurred 100 years earlier.226  Rather, the trigger was the 
expansion of substantive federal law, particularly the enactment and 
interpretation of right-creating statutes governing civil rights, labor and 
employment, and the environment227 and the provision, express or 
implied, of private causes of action to enforce those new rights.228 
In other words, changing jurisdiction alone did not change the 
amount of litigation in federal courts; it was only after enforceable 
substantive right-duty correlatives expanded that the amount of litigation 
expanded, even while federal question jurisdiction remained largely 
unchanged.229  It follows that the amount of litigation will be limited 
                                                     
 225. See Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding Accountability, 
81 TEX. L. REV. 285, 29293 (2002) (discussing origins of fears of litigation explosion during 
1970s); Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 5 (1986) 
(describing the litigation explosion or hyperlexis reading of modern American life, under which 
more litigation is filed in American courts); see also Siegel, supra note 117, at 1114 (arguing that 
Rehnquist Court jurisprudence can be understood as reflecting a hostility to, and an effort to limit, 
private litigation). 
 226. See REDISH, supra note 3, at 96 (stating that Congress established general federal-question 
jurisdiction in 1875); Mishkin, supra note 168, at 157 (same). 
 227. See Mishkin, supra note 168, at 157 (describing the expanding scope of federal 
legislation and its connection to the power of federal courts); Resnik, supra note 2, at 1004 (arguing 
that, post-New Deal, the Supreme Court generally found that Congress had the power to make an 
array of issues federal, thus enabling growth of the federal courts docket); see also, e.g., Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e2000e-17 (2000); Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
of 1968, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651678 (2000); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182 
(2000); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 19731973aa-6; Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. 
No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (holding that § 1983 
supports claims for violations of federal statutes); Monell v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 
(1978) (holding that municipalities are persons for purposes of § 1983); Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 42930 (1971) (holding that Title VII prohibited employment programs having 
racially discriminatory effect); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 18487 (1961) (establishing 
expansive definition of under color of state law in § 1983 to permit claims against state 
government officials who violate state law), overruled on other grounds by Monell, 436 U.S. at 701. 
 228. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979) (holding that factors 
support finding of implied private cause of action to enforce Title IX of the Education Amendments 
of 1972); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 
(1971) (recognizing right to recover damages for violations of constitutional rights by federal 
officers).  But cf. Correctional Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (criticizing heady days in which the Supreme Court assumed common law powers to 
create causes of action). 
 229. In 1980, Congress eliminated an amount-in-controversy requirement from § 1331, marking 
a slight expansion in the scope of jurisdiction under the general federal question grant.  Federal 
Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369.  See 
also Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 505 (2006) (discussing this change).  But most modern 
right-creating statutes contained their own jurisdictional grants, giving the courts power to hear cases 
brought under those statutes regardless of the amount in controversy.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-5(f)(3) (2000) (granting federal jurisdiction over claims brought under substantive 
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most effectively by diminishing substantive rights and the ability to 
privately enforce those rights, rather than diminishing judicial 
jurisdiction simpliciter.  In fact, jurisdiction and litigation need not move 
in the same direction.  While Siegel describes the late Rehnquist Court as 
limiting the institution of litigation by limiting various substantive 
doctrines,230 Steven Vladeck points out that the Court simultaneously 
took an expansive view of judicial power in interpreting federal 
jurisdictional grants.231 
D. Grave Questions of Authority 
A final difference goes to the foundational constitutional structure 
and the question of what legal rule makers are authorized to do.  
Jurisdiction stripping raises grave questions about Congress authority 
to impinge upon judicial jurisdiction.232  It is the subject of longstanding 
doctrinal and theoretical controversy.233  Objections to congressional 
threats are grounded in the text and structure of the Constitution,234 
separation of powers,235 judicial independence,236 the essential role of 
                                                                                                                       
provisions of Title VII); 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (a)(3) (2000) (granting federal jurisdiction over claims 
brought under § 1983).  Thus, it is unlikely that federal courts were able to hear cases after the 1980 
amendment that they otherwise could not have heard under the prior rule.  But cf. Thiboutot, 448 
U.S. at 8 n.6 (accepting, under old version § 1331, that there are some statutory claims that could 
have been brought under § 1983, but for which there would have been no federal jurisdiction unless 
the amount-in-controversy requirement of § 1331 was satisfied). 
 230. Siegel, supra note 117, at 1117 (In myriad ways, the Court has made life very difficult for 
civil plaintiffs.). 
 231. See Steven I. Vladeck, The Increasingly Unflagging Obligation: Federal Jurisdiction 
After Saudi Basic and Anna Nicole, 42 TULSA L. REV. 553, 553 & n.4 (2007) (noting that the trend 
toward expanding jurisdictional grants comes notwithstanding the general substantive hostility to 
litigation that some have found as a consistent pattern in the jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court). 
 232. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 276364, 2769 (2006) (holding that jurisdiction-
stripping provision did not apply retroactively to pending cases, in part to avoid such grave 
questions). 
 233. See Amar, supra note 1, at 14991500 (From the First Judiciary Act on, this question has 
periodically occupied center stage in the high drama of national politics.); Gunther, supra note 1, at 
896 (Jurisdiction-curbing proposals have surfaced in Congress in virtually every period of 
controversial federal court decisions.). 
 234. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 3, at 22930 (synthesizing requirements of Article III into the 
requirement that some Article III court must have the power to resolve finally federal questions and 
admiralty issues). 
 235. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 498 (describing struggle over congressional jurisdiction as 
recurrent example of separation of powers generating interbranch conflict). 
 236. See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 2, at 977 ([I]ndividual judges may be subject to 
indirect pressure through threats to deprive their court of resources or to curtail its jurisdiction.); 
Sager, supra note 3, at 67 (arguing that judicial independence requirements of Article III require 
some effective form of Article III federal judicial review for claims of constitutional right).  Charles 
G. Geyh remarked: 
  To the extent that Congress has, as a matter of constitutional custom, declined to 
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courts in the constitutional order,237 due process,238 and the practicalities 
of modern American constitutional society.239 
The Supreme Court never has directly confronted the question of 
congressional power.240  And commentators are all over the map.241  
Blatant jurisdiction strips such as the Constitution Restoration Act or the 
We the People Actbills that carve specific controversial areas of 
constitutional law out of otherwise broad general federal-question 
jurisdictionhistorically have not gone anywhere.242 
Regardless of how the jurisdiction-stripping debate resolves itself, 
situations in which statutory and constitutional rights are rendered non-
extant do not raise similar grave questions about legal rule-making 
authority.  The illustrations of non-extant rights in this Article all are 
products of the exercise of unquestioned power in some legal decision 
maker to establish substantive legal rules and norms.243  Congress clearly 
is the master of whether to exercise its lawmaking powers and of the 
scope of rights and duties established in such legislation, at least within 
constitutional bounds.  Courts, vested with the power of juridical review, 
properly wield authority (putting to one side whether that authority is 
                                                                                                                       
impeach unpopular judges, to court-pack, or jurisdiction-strip because it has long 
regarded such practices as antithetical to Article III independence, the stature and 
stability of Congresss self-restraint is logically enhanced.  While Congress remains free 
to overlook or override its customs and precedents, decisions to do so must first 
overcome the presumption that such action is contrary to the Constitution as Congress 
has traditionally construed it. 
Geyh, supra note 4, at 16566. 
 237. See Hart, supra note 3, at 1365 (describing the essential role of the Supreme Court in the 
constitutional plan); Sager, supra note 3, at 43 (discussing federal courts responsibility to ensure 
state compliance with federal constitutional norms). 
 238. See REDISH, supra note 3, at 42 (arguing that due process requires that litigants have an 
independent forum for the adjudication of constitutional rights). 
 239. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 504 (arguing that changing circumstances and other 
constitutional realities compel the existence of lower federal courts with jurisdiction to perform 
critical functions in resolving federal issues); Gunther, supra note 1, at 921 (arguing that 
jurisdiction-stripping proposals should be rejected because they are unwise and violate the spirit 
of the Constitution, even though they are . . . within the sheer legal authority of Congress). 
 240. See Pfander, supra note 12, at 194 ([W]e know little about how the Court might analyze 
the [jurisdiction-stripping] legislation.). 
 241. Supra notes 34. 
 242. See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 2, at 988 (The chronic failure of these efforts to divest 
federal courts of jurisdiction easily could mislead one into believing that Congress cannot, as a 
practical matter, effectively control federal judges by regulating their jurisdiction.); Sager, supra 
note 3, at 20 (arguing that, although jurisdiction-stripping measures have been proposed, Congress 
has almost always repudiated such efforts).  But see Pfander, supra note 12, at 194 (suggesting 
current trends perhaps show increased congressional tolerance for strippping measures); supra notes 
912 and accompanying text. 
 243. See Walt, supra note 29. 
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supreme, exclusive, or final244) to interpret the scope and meaning of 
constitutional provisions, particularly right- and liberty-granting 
provisions such as the First Amendment.245  Judicial review necessarily 
compels courts to police the boundaries of congressional power, 
measuring congressional legislation against those boundaries, and 
rejecting legislation that exceeds them.246 
One can, of course, disagree with the scope of resulting rights, on a 
normative argument that the Constitution, justice, or both demand a 
certain level of rights and liberties.247  One can disagree with 
constitutional doctrine that produces particular outcomes and particular 
understandings of federal constitutional law.248  One can believe that the 
federal government ought not affect or alter the existence of common 
law rights, but should leave the issue to other sovereign legal rule 
                                                     
 244. See KRAMER, supra note 5, at 8 (Final interpretive authority [over the Constitution] rested 
with the people themselves, and courts no less than elected representatives were subordinate to 
their judgments.); Whittington, supra note 68, at 782 (Even where the judiciary is active and 
retains the ultimate authority to settle the issue, nonjudicial actors may well engage in a dialogue 
with the Court over the most appropriate interpretation of the Constitution, encouraging the Court to 
adjust its doctrines to accommodate other views.). 
 245. See SAGER, supra note 63, at 70 (Particularly in its liberty-bearing provisions, the 
Constitution offers broad structural propositions and moral generalities, and the judiciary has by and 
large accepted the obligation to fill in these general stipulations with concrete applications, to 
fashion workable and defensible conceptions of the Constitutions moral concepts.); Curtis, supra 
note 68, at 31516 (arguing that James Madison emphasized judicial enforcement and guardianship 
of rights as a way to make the Bill of Rights effective); Louise Weinberg, Our Marbury, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 1235, 139394 (2003) (arguing that Marbury ultimately is about the establishment of judicial 
review of government misconduct); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) 
(It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.); THE 
FEDERALIST No. 78, at 492 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright, ed., 1961) (A 
constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law.  It therefore 
belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding 
from the legislative body.). 
 246. See Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of 
Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951, 972 (2001) (Substantive judicial review of federalism issues is 
necessary both to remind Congress of its own obligation to restrain itself, and to catch any 
particularly egregious examples of federal overreaching . . . . (citation omitted)). 
 247. See DANIEL M. BERMAN, A BILL BECOMES A LAW: THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1960, 117 
(1962) (describing Thurgood Marshalls criticism of weak rights created by the Civil Rights Act of 
1960); William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165, 176 (2001) 
(describing New Deal arguments that citizens had fundamental economic and social rights under 
the Constitution . . . and Congress, therefore, had the duty to exercise its power to govern economic 
and social life in a way that sought to secure those rights); Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain 
Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 410, 421 (1993) 
([G]overnment is obliged to energetically pursue the effacement of injustices entrenched 
consequences.). 
 248. See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 131, at 524 (criticizing Courts decision in Morrison for 
its refusal to entertain the possibility of systemic constitutional wrong); Smolla, supra note 141, at 
1145 (arguing that there was a lameness to the assertion [in Bartnicki] that anytime an otherwise 
private conversation implicates matters of public concern, freedom of speech must trump the right to 
privacy). 
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makers.249  There is particular controversy over Morrison-type judicial 
enforcement of the internal limits on congressional power in the name of 
constitutional federalism.250  But none of these objections goes to the 
essential structural power of legal rule makers to dictate the existence of 
substantive rights and duties.251 
In fact, limiting and eliminating rights is a more appropriate way to 
control courts and parties because it is more transparent than jurisdiction 
stripping.  To eliminate rights, the relevant rule maker must make 
obvious in its legal pronouncement that substantive rights are being 
diminished or eliminated and what the remaining rights will be.  If the 
goal and result is diminishment, non-existence, or non-enforcement of 
some rights, the legal rule maker must say so.252  It cannot play what 
commentators call a political shell gamedeceiving the public as to 
the actual state of legal rights by manipulating process to achieve a result 
rather than dictating the result by changing substantive legal rules.253  
This transparency, at least in theory, enhances democratic accountability; 
the public better understands what has been done to substantive law and 
can hold the rule maker (at least Congress or the President) to answer for 
unpopular limits on rights, liberties, and duties.254 
                                                     
 249. See, e.g., Kairys, supra note 119, at 950 (arguing that federal laws cutting into state 
common law rights undercut coherent and consistent rules and sacrifice basic fairness for the 
expediency of the well connected). 
 250. Compare Kramer, supra note 126, at 287 ([T]here are areas in which the Court has 
historically exercised no or virtually no effective review, of which patrolling the limits of Congresss 
power vis-á-vis the states has been the foremost example throughout our history.), and Post & 
Siegel, supra note 131, at 502 (arguing that the Courts vigorous protection of federalism ignores the 
fact that Americans now believe that a core function of the federal government is to prohibit 
discrimination in the public and private sectors), and Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of 
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 
COLUM. L. REV. 543, 558 (1954) ([T]he national political process in the United Statesand 
especially the role of the states in the composition and selection of the central governmentis 
intrinsically well adapted to retarding or restraining new intrusions by the center on the domain of 
the states.), with Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of 
Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 134 (2001) (A states freedom from federal interference, like an 
individuals freedom from governmental restrictions on expression or private choices, is an 
essentially negative freedom.)  See also supra notes 12739 and accompanying text; cf. Sager, 
supra note 69, at 136566 (arguing that constitutional federalism is the area in which Beta 
disagreements about the content of the Constitution morph into Alpha disagreements). 
 251. Cf. Gunther, supra note 1, at 921 (arguing that jurisdiction-stripping proposals should be 
rejected because they are unwise and violate the spirit of the Constitution, even though they 
are . . . within the sheer legal authority of Congress). 
 252. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 521 (describing suspicion of jurisdictional statutes that 
attempt to control judicial results rather than dockets). 
 253. Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative Deception, Separation of Powers, 
and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory of United States v. Klein, 100 NW. U. 
L. REV. 437, 450 (2006). 
 254. See id. at 45455 (When Congress simultaneously alters the essence of a substantive law 
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This contrasts with hidden limitations on rights affected by 
jurisdiction strips.  For example, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005255 
included the so-called McCain Amendment, which sweepingly created a 
right for detainees in United States military custody to receive certain 
minimum levels of humane treatment and to be free from cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.256  This imposed on the 
United States and its officers a correlative duty to refrain from engaging 
in cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.  But in separate provisions in 
the DTA and the subsequent Military Commissions Act of 2006,257 
Congress stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to hear any claims that 
those rights had been violated or that the United States had ignored the 
duties imposed.258 
A direct attack on claim-rights also is more likely to achieve the 
desired result than an indirect attack on jurisdiction.  With respect to 
statutory rights, Congress has the ultimate word on the scope and 
meaning of statutory rights.259  It can diminish rights in response to 
overly expansive judicial interpretations260 and it can expand rights in 
response to overly narrow judicial interpretations.261  Congress has a 
freer hand (within constitutional bounds) to override and narrow (or 
expand) common law rights and duties, because common law exists 
solely at the sufferance of the legislature and lasts only as long as 
Congress or a state legislature approves of the policy reflected in 
common law rules.262 
On the other hand, the modern constitutional understanding 
precludes Congress or the President from defining constitutional 
meaning, at least as a final matter and at least as to questions on which 
the courts have determined that Congress or the President lacks particular 
                                                                                                                       
through procedural or evidentiary means, the legislators vote on the substantive portion of the law is 
effectively a sham.). 
 255. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005). 
 256. Id. § 1003 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000dd(a) (2006)). 
 257. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006). 
 258. See id. § 1005(e)(1) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(e)(1) (2006)); supra note 8. 
 259. Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 2, at 965 (If the legislature changes the applicable law, for 
example, judicial decisions obviously ought to reflect this fact.). 
 260. See supra notes 9698 and accompanying text. 
 261. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1072 (1991) (codified in 
various sections of United States Code); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 25051 (1994) 
(discussing several Supreme Court decisions the 1991 Act was intended to overturn); Eskridge, 
supra note 94, at 333 & n.4 (listing twelve Supreme Court decisions overridden by the Act).  
Compare, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171 (1989) (holding that 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981 did not prohibit race discrimination during the performance of a contract), with 42 U.S.C. § 
1981(a) (2000) (redefining discrimination in making and enforcing of contracts to prohibit 
discrimination in enforcement). 
 262. See Peters, supra note 114, at 769; supra notes 11420 and accompanying text. 
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power.263  For example, the Court has determined that certain 
government-sponsored religious displays violate the Establishment 
Clause.264  Congress and the President cannot declare that all religious 
displays, even coercive or endorsing ones, are constitutionally 
permissible.  Congresss only alternative is to attack federal judicial 
subject matter jurisdiction, taking constitutional cases away from the 
federal courts and shifting them into (hopefully more receptive, from 
Congresss standpoint) state courts.265 
Of course, jurisdiction stripping achieves the desired result of 
narrowing or eliminating constitutional rights and liberties only if all or a 
substantial number of state high courts depart from controlling Supreme 
Court precedent.266  If many state courts continue to abide by precedent, 
substantive First Amendment law remains unchanged. 
In an attempt to avoid this barrier to the effectiveness of jurisdiction 
stripping, the Constitution Restoration Act (from the 109th Congress) 
explicitly provided that federal court precedent on governmental 
acknowledgement of God was not binding on state courts.267  The bills 
proponents obviously sought to signal to state courts their preferred 
substantive law and to give the courts greater decisional freedom.268  But 
James Pfander argues that such a provision constitutes an invalid 
interference with the courts.  State courts hearing federal cases should be 
understood as having been constituted, via appointment, as federal 
tribunals that are inferior to the Supreme Court, on par with lower 
federal courts.269  The obligation of inferiority to the Supreme Court  
 
                                                     
 263. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (rejecting congressional power to 
decree the meaning of the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment); supra note 69 and 
accompanying text. 
 264. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 864 (2005) (display of Ten Commandments 
in courthouse); County of Allegheny v. ACLU of Greater Pittsburgh, 492 U.S. 573, 59091 (1989) 
(crèche and other religious symbols in county building); see sources cited supra note 178. 
 265. See KRAMER, supra note 5, at 249, 25051 (arguing that some of the most admired 
Presidents and Congresses turned to blunt political tools, such as jurisdiction stripping, only after the 
judicial power expanded and created the need to create some degree of control and accountability). 
 266. Compare Sager, supra note 3, at 41 (arguing that manipulating jurisdiction to check federal 
courts offers no control over the state courts, which continue to be bound by existing Supreme 
Court precedent), with Gerhardt, supra note 11, at 128283 (expressing fear that pushing 
constitutional cases into state court allows state courts to effectively overrule Supreme Court 
decisions). 
 267. Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, S. 520, 109th Cong. § 301 (2005); supra note 9 and 
accompanying text. 
 268. Sager, supra note 3, at 6869 (arguing that state courts are particularly vulnerable as 
adjudicative forums in the face of the obvious desire of Congress that disfavored claims be 
repudiated). 
 269. Pfander, supra note 12, at 212 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 8, cl. 9). 
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requires state courts, while acting as inferior federal tribunals, to give 
effect to the decisions of the Supreme Court.270 
V. CONCLUSION 
Jurisdiction is a word of many, too many meanings.271  Jurisdiction 
stripping becomes a phrase of many, too many meanings when courts 
and commentators too-readily loosely but realistically272 equate 
jurisdiction stripping with any and all legal rules that limit the ability of 
individuals to recover on federal claims of right in federal court.  
Jurisdiction stripping also is a loaded and controversial term.  Overuse 
and misuse extends that controversy into matters that should not be 
subject to structural controversy. Limits on extant constitutional, 
statutory, and common law rights do limit the ability of individuals to 
recover on claims of right in federal court. But I have tried to argue that 
these are not limits on jurisdiction and should not be analyzed, or 
criticized, as if they are. 
The imperative of disentangling jurisdiction stripping from non-
extant substantive rights thus is a subset of the imperative of 
disentangling subject matter jurisdiction from substantive merits of 
federal rights and federal claims of right.273  The law functions better in 
the courts and as a formalist matter when we recognize and respect these 
formalist and consequential distinctions between jurisdiction and 
meritsand the formalist and consequential distinctions between 
limiting or eliminating jurisdiction and limiting or eliminating 
substantive rights, liberties, and duties. 
 
                                                     
 270. Id. at 22930 (arguing that the inferiority requirement requires state courts, acting as federal 
tribunals, to remain subordinate to the Supreme Court, obliging them to give effect to Supreme 
Court precedent). 
 271. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1242 (2006) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
Better Envt, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998)). 
 272. Weinberg, supra note 13, at 140708. 
 273. See Wasserman, supra note 23, at 64445. 
